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- FATHERS BEHIND BARS: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

IN CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
MICHELE HERMANN AND SHANNON DONAHUE'

I. INTRODUCTION
Every year a number of men are jailed in the State of New Mexico
for failing to meet their child support obligations. Some fathers are incarcerated because the courts have determined that their nonpayment is
in contempt of a court order.' Others are arrested on bench warrants after
failing to appear at show cause hearings on pending contempt charges. 3
For many men, the use of incarceration to enforce the court's order in
a civil proceeding is effective immediately. They either pay their child
support arrears or post bond, normally set in the amount of the arrears,
and secure their release from jail. In these cases, the contempt proceeding
has succeeded in coercing compliance with the order of the court. 4
For other fathers, however, the use of jail to force payment of child
support is futile because they are indigent. These men do not have the
money to make their child support payments when they become due.
They lack the resources to pay their arrearages or to post bond and secure
their release. Furthermore, they do not have enough money to hire a
lawyer to represent them in their contempt proceedings. If failure to pay
child support were the subject of a criminal charge,' these indigent fathers
would be assigned counsel automatically.6 Their cases would progress
smoothly and rapidly through the adjudication process.' Yet because nonpayment of support arises in a civil context, these men normally do not
receive appointed counsel.' Moreover, because of the nature of the civil
process, the jailed father's case does not progress automatically. The
parties in a civil case are responsible for making their own motions and
1. Michele Hermann is an Associate Professor at the University of New Mexico School of Law;
Shannon Donahue is a 1983 graduate of the University of New Mexico School of Law and an
Associate of Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin and Robb, P.A. A number of students have assisted in
the work for this article including: Vicki Slade, Mary Ann Green, Gary Marquez, Mary Han and
Greg Jones. Their help is gratefully acknowledged.
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
3. N.M. R. Civ. P. 45(f).
4. State v. Magee Publishing Co., 29 N.M. 455, 224 P. 1028 (1924).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§40-5-20 to -21 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-15-12 (1978).
7. N.M. R. Crim. P. 37.
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-16-3 (1978).
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requesting hearings.' From a practical perspective, this process means
that the indigent jailed father must rely on his opponent's counsel to get
his case before the court. Days or weeks may pass before an incarcerated
father who is too poor to hire a lawyer is brought before a judge.' 0
When the unrepresented father finally makes his first court appearance
on the contempt charge, the judge should consider whether the case entails
an especially complex or technical defense in which due process requires
the assignment of counsel. " Often, however, the courts immediately
equate nonpayment with contempt, and do not seriously consider whether
the defense of inability to comply with the court's order exists.' 2 As a
result, judges rarely inquire whether constitutional considerations require
legal assistance for the indigent father. 3
Nor do jailed fathers face only the limited resources of a private individual. Most often, the State of New Mexico represents the petitioner.
When the family is poor, the children may receive welfare payments in
the form of Aid to Dependent Children, 4 and the State of New Mexico
becomes the assignee of the children's right to receive support payments
from the father. In these cases, the State Human Services Division initiates
enforcement of the child support decree,' 5 and the father must face the
power and resources of the state.
Not all jailed persons facing civil contempt proceedings are fathers
who have failed to pay their child support. Some are parties in domestic
relations cases who have failed to comply with marital settlement agreements or decrees. 6 Others have been charged with civil contempt because
they have failed to attend depositions or have failed to comply with other
pendente lite orders."' Some of these jailed defendants are indigent and
unable to post bond or hire an attorney. They also face the risk that
substantial periods of time may pass before they are brought before the
court to request assignment of counsel, have a hearing, or review conditions of release.
9. The contempt proceedings are an extension of the original civil action and follow the same
procedures as a civil case. The attorney for the wife (or the Human Services Division) must request
that the father be found in contempt, and then move that a bench warrant be issued for his arrest.
Likewise, it is up to the parties to petition the court for the father's release or to set a hearing to
determine the conditions of release.
10. There is no established procedure for judicial review of the incarcerated father's case in the
absence of action by the parties. The father is incarcerated indefinitely. The wife or her attorney
may have little incentive to arrange for the release of a recalcitrant father and, in some cases, the
prisoner literally may be forgotten.
1I. State of N.M. ex rel. Dep't of Human Services v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 642 P.2d 1099 (1982).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
13. Counsel was not assigned in any case studied in Bernalillo County. See infra text accompanying
notes 20-23.
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-2-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-2-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
17. N.M. R. Civ. P. 37(B)(1) (failure to attend a deposition) and 45 (f) (failure to obey a subpoena).
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This article examines what happens to civil litigants who are jailed in
Bernalillo County and why they lack the resources to secure their release
or to retain counsel. The focus is on whether there is a right to appointed
counsel in these circumstances, and whether there is a particular need
for representation when the defendant is incarcerated." This article also
analyzes the recent New Mexico Supreme Court decision in State of New
Mexico ex rel. Departmentof Human Services v. Rael, 9 which recognizes
a limited right to counsel for indigents charged with civil contempt. This
analysis examines Rael in the context of New Mexico practice, and
compares it with constitutionally based decisions from other jurisdictions.
II. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
20

A. Statistics
In the past twenty-four months, 131 men were jailed in Bernalillo
County on bench warrants for civil contempt arising out of their nonpayment of child support. Of those contemnors for whom records were
available, 21 seventy-four out of 102 (72.5%) were not represented by
counsel. Twenty-eight out of 102 (27.5%) were represented by counsel.
The contemnors who were unrepresented spent an average of fourteen
days in jail while those represented by counsel spent an average of three
days in jail. 22 Most of the suits leading to the contempt charges were
initiated by the Human Services Division of the state government. The
Division prosecuted seventy-one percent of the 102 cases, while the others
were brought by private parties.
When a bench warrant was issued, it generally directed the sheriff to
notify the attorney for the plaintiff upon the arrest of the contemnor. This
directive was given in forty-five of sixty bench warrants examined. In
thirteen out of sixty warrants (21.7%), there were no directives to notify
anyone. In the other two cases (3.3%), there were directives to notify
18. The father who fails to pay child support also commonly fails to appear at one or more of
the hearings in the case. It is not unusual for a defendant to default on the original child support or
paternity suit and never come before a judge until he is arrested on a bench warrant and incarcerated.
See infra text accompanying notes 24-31.
19. 97 N.M. 640, 642 P.2d 1099 (1982).
20. These figures were compiled by inspecting the daily arrest log for Bernalillo County. Cases
where the arrest was for civil rather than criminal reasons were identified by the DR (Domestic
Relations) or CIV (Civil) designation on the warrant. Release information was obtained from the
records at Bernalillo County Detention Center. Other case information was obtained from court files
in individual cases.
21. For some persons listed as civilly arrested, there was no case number and their court files
could not be located. For other persons, court files or other critical documents were missing.
22. This figure may overestimate the time spent in jail by represented defendants. Often where
an entry of appearance was filed or a motion for release made, it was difficult to ascertain when the
lawyer first entered the case. It seems likely, however, that some of the men who ultimately were
represented by counsel spent some time in jail before securing the services of an attorney.
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the court. The significance of such directives is that the court will set a
hearing only upon notification and request.23
B. Bench Warrant Procedures
A civil litigant who fails to appear in court, or does not obey the orders
of the court, may be found in contempt. If the defendant does not appear,
the judge may issue a bench warrant for his arrest. Generally, the attorney
for the .plaintiff prepares the bench warrant and moves the court for its
issuance.24 The plaintiff's attorney provides the address of the defendant
and also may give instructions on the face of the bench warrant requesting
notice upon the arrest of the defendant. 25 Occasionally, the judge also
will ask to be notified. If the attorney for the plaintiff omits this notice
instruction from the bench warrant, no one will be notified when the
defendant is arrested. When the defendant is brought to jail, the arresting
officer leaves the original warrant at the booking desk.26 A person from
the District Attorney's office collects the original warrants daily when he
picks up other criminal records. The civil arrest warrants are then taken
to the civil clerk's office of the district court.27 The District Attorney's
office usually will take the civil booking slips to the clerk's office as
well. 28 The clerk files the return of the warrant and the booking slip in
the court file.29 The judge who issued the bench warrant may learn that
the defendant was arrested when the clerk's office receives and files the
return on the warrant or the booking slip. 3° The judge normally does not
schedule a hearing, however, unless one is requested by a party. 3'
C. Case Histories
In order to illustrate what has happened in civil contempt cases when
the respondent is not represented by counsel, it is helpful to examine in
detail the development of some actual cases. The unnecessary delays in
the proceedings illustrate the helplessness of the unrepresented, incarcerated litigant moving his case through the system. The transcripts of
23. See infra text accompanying notes 257-68.
24. Interview with personnel of the Civil Division, Second Judicial District (August 23, 1983).
25. Id.
26. Interview with personnel of the Administrative Office, Bernalillo County Sheriff's Division
(July 27, 1983). If the defendant is stopped for other reasons, such as a traffic offense, the warrant
will show as a "hold" on the computer, but will not be physically produced. In these cases, notice
that the warrant has been served will not be given. Lawyers from the Child Support Enforcement
Bureau report that they learn of these cases only if the defendant calls them from jail.
27. Interview with Personnel of the Court Relations Office of Bernalillo County Detention Center
(August 15, 1983).
28. Id.
29. Interview with Personnel of the Civil Division, Second Judicial District (August 23, 1983).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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these cases are particularly significant because they show defendants who
are too confused and inarticulate to explain their allegedly contemptuous
behavior. Furthermore, they show judges who fail to consider the directives of Rael by not conducting any inquiry into the respondent's need
for counsel. A detailed examination of these cases demonstrates the futility
in some aspects of the child support enforcement system, as well as a
significant gap between what the law requires in these cases and what
actually occurs.32
1. Case History #1
This respondent was jailed for failure to pay child support on May 18,
1982. He was released thirty days later on June 18, 1982. He was never
represented by counsel. He met the mother of his child in 1978. She
became pregnant and a daughter was born August 18, 1981. The child
received financial assistance from the Department of Human Services,
and therefore, the State of New Mexico filed a paternity petition seeking
reimbursement of support payments and future monthly payments of
$150. Respondent did not appear or answer the petition, and on February
24, 1982, a default judgment was entered awarding the state $1,344, as
well as ordering respondent to make future support payments of $150
per month.
The respondent made no payments on this judgment, and on March
29, 1982, the state moved for an order that he show cause why he should
not be held in contempt. Once again, the respondent did not appear, and
a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. The warrant required that he
be incarcerated in the Bernalillo County Jail until such time as he posted
a cash bond of $350 or until the matter was heard by the court.
The respondent was arrested at his home on May 18, 1982 and was
booked into jail. He did not post bond. On June 7, 1982, the state
requested a hearing to review his incarceration. The hearing was set for
June 18, and the defendant was released that day. He was ordered to
make weekly written reports to the Child Support Enforcement Bureau
regarding his efforts to seek employment. No reports were made, nor did
the respondent make any payments.
In October of 1982, the Department of Human Services again moved
for an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not
be held in contempt for failing to make weekly reports to the Child Support
Enforcement Bureau. A hearing was scheduled for November 3, 1982,
32. The information contained in these case histories was obtained from court files, interviews
with the respondents, their families, and the Department of Human Services Child Support Enforcement Bureau, and records at the Bernalillo County Detention Center. These cases were selected
arbitrarily because they came to the attention of the University of New Mexico School of Law,
rather than by random selection. No confidential information is revealed in these case histories.
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but it was continued because the respondent was not given adequate
notice. In the Order of Continuance, the court specified as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner be, and hereby is,
placed upon notice that the Court may, at such time as this matter
is called for hearing in the future, appoint counsel to represent the
respondent in these proceedings, the Court being of the opinion that
the respondent may very well not completely understand the nature
of the proceedings against him ...
The hearing was rescheduled for January 7, 1983, and then was reset to
April 21, 1983.
At the hearing the respondent appeared without a lawyer. Despite the
court's previous order, no inquiry was conducted about respondent's
ability to retain counsel or understand the proceedings. Instead, the following occurred:
[Counsel for the State]: And this is [Respondent].
The Court: You're here without a lawyer, Mr. [Respondent]?
[Respondent]: Yes, sir.
The Court: Do you want to proceed, then?
[Counsel for the State]: We're here today on a motion for order to
show cause ....
[recites history of the case] . . . We've brought
him here today, Your Honor, to have him show to the Court reasons
why he shouldn't be found in contempt of court for failure to have
contacted our office or to have filed any of these reports.
The Court: Okay. What do you want to say, Mr. [Respondent]?
[Respondent tries to explain his efforts to find work.]
The court then questioned the respondent and ordered him to make monthly
reports to the Department of Human Services. To date, there have been
no reports, nor has the respondent made any payments. Another bench
warrant has been issued.
2. Case History #2
The defendant was married in September of 1977 and divorced in
August of 1978. There were no children. The defendant was ordered to
pay $2,300 as a lump sum property settlement on August 13, 1979. By
November 1981, he had paid only $500, and his ex-wife moved for an
order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. The defendant
did not appear at this hearing, and a bench warrant was issued for his
arrest with bond set at $2,162.25, which represented the amount of arrears
with interest and attorney's fees.
On January 28, 1982, the respondent was arrested and booked into
jail. A contempt hearing was set for February 8, 1982. At the hearing,
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the respondent tried to explain to the court that he had worked steadily
for twenty years until April of 1979, when he learned that he had stomach
cancer, and underwent surgery in which most of his stomach was removed. He told the judge that he had no money, had terminal cancer,
was too ill to work, and could not afford to hire an attorney. The judge
responded, "Well, I don't know anything I can do about this today until
I check into it a little bit, if it's a question of his health problem. But
until I have more facts, I'm unwilling to release him." 3 3 The judge
33. In order to give a clearer picture of this case, and the obvious need for counsel, an edited
transcript of the entire hearing is reproduced below. It should be noted that this hearing predates the
Rael decision by two and one-half months.
(In Chambers)
THE COURT: What case is this, please?
COUNSEL: This is [Wife v. Husband].
THE COURT: Do you want any testimony taken?
COUNSEL: If I could explain for a second what the status of the case is. Back
in 1979, there was a final order, a decree of divorce ordering [respondent] to pay
to his ex-wife the amount of $1800. That amount was not paid .... So on
November 18, 1981, 1caused an order to show cause to be filed. He was ordered,
pursuant to the court, to pay the money. He never showed up, defaulted on that.
Then the order was issued by the Court December 1 of 1981, instructing him to
pay the $1800 plus $362 attorney's fees to me on or before 5 p.m. December
18, 1981. The order was properly served upon Mr. [respondent]. I received no
response, and then back on January 13, 1982, a bench warrant was issued. My
understanding is that he was taken into custody on January 28, 1982, on this
particular bench warrant....
THE COURT: The last item in the file is the order of December 1st.
COUNSEL: That's the last item in the file. Oh, we attached that to the bench
warrant, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I see.
COUNSEL: You had asked that we attach that to the bench warrant. So we
went ahead and did that. My client would like her money. I'd like to be paid my
attorney fees, and I don't know what [respondent] has to say.
THE COURT: Do you wish to say anything?
[RESPONDENT]: It's just new to me. Well, I remember the deal. The last
time I was here, Your Honor, you had gave me $100 for her lawyer that didn't
show up, and I never got paid from her lawyer, her first lawyer. You are [h]er
second one ain't you?
COUNSEL: I believe I am, yes.
[RESPONDENT]: And I never got $100, anyway. That didn't mean much to
me. I had got sick. I had my stomach removed, and I could not read or write,
and I did not know what was going on. I had some traffic violations, which has
nothing to do with this case. I got mixed up, and the people that help me-well,
did help me-was a state cop, and he got in a wreck and a lot of things got mixed
up, and the Doc said I couldn't work for a year, anyway, and I remember this
gentleman did call me and explained to me I could go to jail, and I said, WellI went to Lawrence and asked him about it, and I said, "Okay, send him some
money."
THE COURT: Excuse me. Who is Lawrence?
[RESPONDENT]: Well, he's the cop that helped me, and nothing came out of
it, and I never did it blindly. I never did anything. I've been here 26 years. I
have just got sick. They took out my stomach. They told me I was going to die.
I ain't dead, yet, but I just couldn't make it. I had medical records showing that
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I had my stomach out and been sick. Then I lost my job and everything else.
Nobody wants to hire me because I got one lung missing, one stomach missing.
THE COURT: What is the relief that you seek at this time?
[RESPONDENT]: I don't want to claim bankruptcy, anyway.
COUNSEL: He owes the money, and we would ask the Court that if he can't
pay the money that he be held in contempt of court.
THE COURT: Well, do you want him-are you asking that his incarceration
be continued?
COUNSEL: I believe that I am, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I need to know that.
COUNSEL: That's what I'm asking. I'm asking that his incarceration be continued until he either comes up with the money or he's purged, somehow-purged
of the contempt. I mean, he knows, and I feel for [respondent]. I'm aware of
what his medical problems are and so is his former wife. He agreed to this property
settlement agreement. He has not complied with his agreement. I've had additional
conversations with him after the August 13, 1979 order where he promised to
make the payments and make[RESPONDENT]: I didn't promise nothing.
COUNSEL: This is my turn to talk. You can speak when I'm done. He promised
to make the payments. He promised to keep the $100 payment schedule. We tried
to cooperate with him in every way possible, and he just has refused to cooperate
with us.
THE COURT: Is it your position that, at that time, he did have funds?
COUNSEL: Oh, yes. He had funds at that time. I mean, he told me that he
had funds, and he could afford to make $100 a month payments. This was back
in 1979, and it was my belief that he was making the payments to his ex-wife
like he said he was going to make his payments to his ex-wife.
She called me up, and I believe it was probably late October of 1981, and
said, "Well, he hasn't been making the payments all this period of time, and I
think that we ought to do something about it." So, at that point in time, I draftedor shortly thereafter, I drafted the order to show cause and brought him back
before the Court. And during that period of time, he did not respond to the order
that was served upon him. He did not-the order to show cause, he did not
respond to the subsequent order that was signed by the Court that was properly
served upon him, and his excuse today is, "Well, I can't read."
When I was talking to him before, we came in here, and he said he was aware
that these papers were filed and that he was aware he was behind, what was he
going to do, he was sick, and he was going to die.
THE COURT: Do you want to say anything further?
[RESPONDENT]: I have less respect for him, Your Honor, than anyone I've
ever known. That man-I never said anything that he said I said, and so help me
God, I never said it. That man is more lying. First of all, Your Honor, when I
got this divorce, I paid $500 for lawyer fees. I paid $500 for her lawyer's fee. I
thought I paid $1200 bucks. If I didn't have any intention not to pay, I wouldn't
have paid $1000 or $1200. I never made any promise. Lawrence wrote a letter
for me saying different things. I don't know where he is.
THE COURT: Who is Lawrence?
[RESPONDENT]: He's a state policeman I know, and I got him to write it,
and we had it registered letter.
THE COURT: Excuse me. So I'll understand, you didn't have a lawyer?
[RESPONDENT]: No.
THE COURT: Is there any reason you didn't get one when she had one?
[RESPONDENT]: Well, I had a lawyer, and she didn't show up, but we went
ahead and got the divorce.
COUNSEL: He was represented by [counsel] at the time of the divorce decree.
(RESPONDENT]: And I paid $1200, and I have her $500, but like I said, I
had got sick, and that's no excuse and being ignorant, because I went to high
school. I didn't finish. I'm not using that as an excuse.
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I'm still willing to pay if I had a job and if I was working. I might be stupid
not to read a book, but I'm wise enough to know that what I know to go to court.
I don't go by the month. I go from the 1st to the 12th month. If somebody says,
"You go on the 1 th month to court, on the 22nd," I don't go by August or
whatever, and I'm not even using that as an excuse, but I did pay, and like I
said, when I went to court, the judge gave me a $100 reward, $90, and I said I
didn't want the $90, just forget it because she never showed up.
So I mean, I didn't hang up with the 90 bucks. I just tried to do what was
right, and it's not my fault, and if he wants to put me in jail, that would even
get me-if I could get on my feet and pay her back the money, I still couldn't
do it if I was in jail.
THE COURT: Have you had medical treatment?
[RESPONDENT]: Well, I can't afford it.
THE COURT: I mean over in jail?
[RESPONDENT]: At BCMC, no. All I do is take the pills, and they give me
pills to kill some of the pain. So I just try to wait to see what happens.
THE COURT: Well, is there any question about him getting medical attention?
THE TRANSPORT OFFICER: I have no idea, Your Honor. We have medics
on duty. They're supposed to do something if something is wrong.
THE COURT: Have you talked to them?
[RESPONDENT]: I went down to the doctor, and they can't do anything because
I'm supposed to go to BCMC and get treatment, and I can't afford to go to BCMC
treatments. The first time in my life I got 40 bucks worth of food stamps, and
that made me feel like that.
THE COURT: Have you actually inquired about, you say[RESPONDENT]: Well, I went and I not only can't afford it, I can't fill out
the papers. I can't get social security because I can't go down and fill out the
securities. I could get money there, and I don't.
THE COURT: Can't you inquire at the jail so they can get those papers and
bring them to you?
[RESPONDENT]: Only ones that ever comes there is the library people. They
come around with books.
THE COURT: Have you talked to Joe Gutierrez or who runs the place.
[RESPONDENT]: No.
THE COURT: Is there any reason why you have not?
[RESPONDENT]: Because I didn't know about it. You're just telling me something new. I didn't know they had a program.
THE COURT: Well, I don't know whether they do or not, but I would certainly
assume that if you're in need of medical care, that they will furnish it for you.
Well, I'm unwilling to let you out at this time until I know about what your
situation is over there. It's clear at the time this order was entered that it was
justified because you didn't make the payments, and obviously, $500 apparently
was paid, but you[RESPONDENT]: That was the money that I had from working from the garage,
and then, like I said, I got sick and that took care of it all. The Doc said I couldn't
even work for a year. I told him how was I going to live. He said, "Well, don't
worry about the bills." Two months later, they tell me-they sent me a letter
putting me in bad credit. The attorney told me I couldn't work for a year.
THE COURT: What attorney was that?
[RESPONDENT]: Well, the doctor. He told me not to work for a year.
THE COURT: Who was your original attorney in this matter?
COUNSEL: It was [counsel].
THE COURT: Have you discussed the matter with him?
COUNSEL: No, he hasn't, Your Honor. Shortly after the divorce property
settlement agreement was signed and entered, [counsel] withdrew as his attorney
because he wasn't being paid.
[RESPONDENT]: Who wasn't [counsel]?
COUNSEL: That what he told me.
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returned the respondent to jail where he remained incarcerated until May
12, 1982, three and one-half months after his arrest. He was released
only because jail personnel called the University of New Mexico School
of Law and asked if someone could investigate the situation and try to
secure his release.
3. Case History #3
On May 24, 1982, the State of New Mexico filed a Nonsupport Petition
against the respondent on behalf of his ex-wife. A hearing was set for
June 16, 1982. On that date the respondent appeared pro se and signed
a form entitled "Waiver and Entry of Appearance," which contained the
following language:
Respondent states that he/she has stipulated as to all the issues herein
and further states that he/she waives hearing and notice of hearing
in this cause and agrees that judgement may be entered on the parties'
stipulation together with such further order as the Court shall deem
right and just.34
A judgment was entered ordering the respondent to pay $75 per month,
and awarding arrears of $2,252.94 to his ex-wife and $1,584 to the
Department of Human Services for welfare payments received by the exwife.
In October of 1982, the state moved for an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be found in contempt. A
hearing was held on November 8, 1982. The respondent appeared without
counsel, and the court did not ask whether respondent had a lawyer, could
afford a lawyer, or needed legal assistance. Instead, the judge immediately
placed the respondent under oath so that the state's lawyer could ask him
about his finances and his employment. The respondent then was asked
if he had anything to say, and he attempted to explain that he currently
had many expenses, did not have a job, and had never earned enough to
make his payments. The attorney for the state responded:
I would ask the Court to find Respondent in contempt and to fashion
some type of remedy that's going to encourage [him] to comply with
the orders of this court. He's not employed right now; therefore, I
[RESPONDENT]: He was paid.
COUNSEL: That's what he told me, but this was 1979, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I don't know of anything I can do about this today until
I check into it a little bit, if it's a question of his health problems. Until I have
more facts, I'm unwilling to release him. That's all.
34. It is unclear whether this form is intended to act as a waiver of the limited right to counsel
recognized by the supreme court in Rael. If so, it certainly fails to meet constitutional standards.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 302 U.S. 458 (1938) (stating that a waiver of the sixth amendment right to
counsel must be made intelligently and competently in light of known facts and circumstances).
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don't believe incarceration would jeopardize his employment, and I
think it might convince him that in the future when the Court orders
him to support his child, he might do it.
The court found the respondent in willful contempt of court, and stated
as follows:
[Respondent] is in willful contempt of court, that is, civil contempt
of court, and it's the duty of the judge to impose some type of penalty
to encourage compliance with the Court's orders in the future, and
the judge should use the least amount of penalty that is reasonably
designed to accomplish this purpose.3"
The judge sentenced the respondent to thirty days imprisonment, suspended twenty of those days, and required that the remaining ten days
be served without good time or work release.
On May 16, 1983, a bench warrant was issued for the respondent's
arrest after he failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to invoke the
remaining twenty days of his sentence because he had not made any
payments. This warrant is still outstanding.
III. STATE EX REL. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES V. RAEL
A. Overview

As the statistics and case histories demonstrate, the assistance of counsel may be of critical importance to someone incarcerated for failure to
pay child support. Without a lawyer, the case may never be set for trial
and valid defenses may never be raised. In State ex rel. Department of
Human Services v. Rael,36 the New Mexico Supreme Court considered
whether an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel in a civil
contempt proceeding brought by the state to enforce an order of child
support.37 The defendant, Rael, argued that he had a right to appointed
counsel under the sixth amendment and the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 38
The supreme court rejected Rael's sixth amendment argument, but held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment may require
appointment of counsel if such assistance is necessary to provide a fundamentally fair contempt hearing. 39 The court stated that counsel might
35. It seems that despite the court's characterization of the contempt as "civil," the punitive
nature of the sentence makes it a criminal contempt. See infra text accompanying notes 86-104, and
compare Niemyjski v. Niemyjski, 98 N.M. 176, 646 P.2d 1240 (1982) with Cliett v. Hammonds,
305 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1962).
36. 97 N.M. 640, 642 P.2d 1099 (1982).
37. Id. at 641, 642 P.2d at 1100.
38. Id. at 642, 642 P.2d at 1101.
39. Id. at 644-45, 642 P.2d at 1103-04.
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be needed in cases involving complex issues, "such as whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to present his case in prior proceedings or whether he has available certain defenses ... 40
B. Facts
The Department of Human Services originally brought suit for a determination of paternity 4t and for support of a minor recipient of public
assistance. 42 Rael did not appear and the court entered a default judgment
against him. More than one year later, Rael failed to appear at a hearing
to determine whether he was in contempt of court for his alleged failure
to comply with the support order. 4 ' The court issued a bench warrant and
Rael was arrested. At the hearing on the warrant and contempt allegation,
Rael appeared without counsel. The court continued the hearing after
determining that Rael did not understand the proceedings and needed the
services of an attorney. ' Rael moved for appointment of counsel on the
40. Id. at 645, 642 P.2d at 1104 (quoting Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 422, -, 322 A.2d 1, 4
(1974)).
41. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-5-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1983), which provides as follows: "The proceeding to compel support and establish parentage of the child may be brought by a parent or if the
child is or is likely to be a public charge, by the state of New Mexico .... If the proceeding is
brought by the public authorities, the parents may be made defendants."
42. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-2-28 (Repl. Pamp. 1982):
A. A noncustodial parent is liable to the department in the amount of the public
assistance lawfully and properly furnished to the children, and the spouse or
former spouse with whom such children are living, to whom the noncustodial
parent owes a duty of support; except that if a support order has been entered,
liability for the time period covered by the support order shall not exceed the
amount of support provided for in the order, and provided that no claim not based
upon a prior judgment can be made by the department for reimbursement for any
period more than six years prior to the date of filing of any action seeking paymeni.
B. Amounts of support due and owing for periods prior to the granting of
public assistance shall be paid to and retained by the department to the extent
that the amount of assistance granted exceeds the amount of the monthly support
obligation.
C. Amounts of support collected which are in excess of the amounts specified
in Subsections A and B of this section will be paid by the department to the
custodian of the child.
D. No agreement between any custodian of a child and a parent of that child,
either relieving the parent of any duty of child or spousal support or responsibility
or purporting to settle past, present or future support obligations, either as a
settlement or prepayment, shall act to reduce or terminate any rights of the
department to recover from that parent for support provided, unless the department
has consented to the agreement in writing.
E. The noncustodial parent shall be given credit for any support actually provided, including housing, clothing, food or funds paid prior to the entry of any
order for support. The noncustodial parent has the burden on the issue of any
payment.
43. 97 N.M. at 642, 642 P.2d at 1101.
44. Id.
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basis of his indigency. 45 The court denied his motion and the supreme
court granted an interlocutory appeal.
C. The New Mexico Supreme Court Decision
1. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The supreme court first considered whether Rael had a right to appointed counsel under the sixth amendment. The court noted that the
"sixth amendment right to counsel guarantee applies only to criminal
prosecutions," and that it had to determine whether Rael's contempt
proceeding was civil or criminal.46 To make that determination, the court
considered five factors.
The court first dismissed, without analysis, the fact that Rael could
have been prosecuted criminally for nonsupport,47 stating only that
"[a]lthough Rael could have been criminally prosecuted . . . the present
proceeding is civil in nature." 48 The court next considered whether the
contempt proceeding was a separate and independent proceeding or a
continuation of a previous suit. The contempt action before the court was
an enforcement action based on the previous paternity and support suit,
and therefore, the court concluded it was not a separate and independent
proceeding.49
The third inquiry by the court was whether the state or a private party
was bringing the contempt action. The court concluded that although the
state was bringing the action, the state was only an assignee of the
mother's claim and, therefore, it was not exercising its police powers."
The Rael court continued its discussion by noting that the defendant's
failure to pay support in compliance with a court order was not "done
in disrespect of the court," did not obstruct justice, and did not tend "to
bring the court into disrepute."' Finally, the supreme court found that
45. Id. Rael had tried to obtain counsel from Northern New Mexico Legal Services, Inc., but
the office refused to represent him because it "had become involved in a disproportionate number
of such actions to the detriment of other indigent civil litigants." Transcript of Proceedings at 2,
State ex rel. Dep't of Human Services v. Rael. Rael made his request for appointment of counsel
with the aid of Northern New Mexico Legal Services, which entered a special appearance for that
purpose. Id. at 3.
46. 97 N.M. at 642, 642 P.2d at 1101.
47. Id. at 642-43, 642 P.2d at 1101-02. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§40-5-20 to -21 (Repl. Pamp.
1983), which provide for criminal prosecution for failure to support a child and failure to comply
with a judgment for support of a child.
48. 97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
49. Id.
50. Id. The state's power to act as assignee stems from 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(26)(A)(1976), 45
C.F.R. § 232.11 (a)(1980), and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-5-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
51. 97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102. The Rael court labeled this factor as most important. An
act done out of disrespect for the court includes an act "which obstructs the due and proper administration of justice, or which tends to bring the court into disrepute in the form of public opinion."
Id. (quoting State v. Magee Publishing Co., 29 N.M. 455, 471, 224 P. 1028, 1029 (1924)).
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"the nature and purpose of the punishment are clearly civil." 5 2 Based on
this analysis, the court concluded that the contempt was civil in nature
and that therefore Rael did not have a sixth amendment right to appointed
counsel.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Right to a Fundamentally Fair Hearing
The New Mexico Supreme Court next considered whether appointed
counsel might be necessary to ensure a fundamentally fair contempt hearing. The court noted that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was implicated because Rael faced the possibility of imprisonment.
Relying on a recent United States Supreme Court case, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,53 the Rael court held that an indigent does
not necessarily have a fourteenth amendment due process right to appointed counsel whenever he faces civil contempt charges which might
subject him to imprisonment.
In its analysis, the supreme court began with the recognition that "[an
indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses,
he may be deprived of his personal liberty." 54 The court then balanced
this factor against the "private interests at stake, the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions, and the government's
interest," to determine whether an indigent is entitled to appointed counsel
under the due process clause."
Under the first prong of the test, the court considered the importance
of Rael's liberty and property interests. The court stated that the defendant's "extremely important" liberty interest was not as strong as it would
be in a criminal proceeding because he would only lose his liberty if he
had the ability to comply and failed to do so. 56 Furthermore, the court
52. 97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
53. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
54. 97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452
U.S. 18, 26 (1981)).
55. 97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102. This test comes from the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the United States Supreme
Court set forth the elements of the due process balancing test:
Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental
and private interests that are affected (citations omitted). More precisely, our prior
decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest
that wil be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 344-35.
56. 97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
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found that Rael had a limited property interest because it had been adjudicated in the original suit.57 Under the second prong of the test, the
court determined that the presence of an appointed attorney "would do
little to enhance the accuracy of the decision making in most cases"
because "[g]enerally the legal and factual issues in a contempt hearing
are not complex." 58 Under the third prong of the test, the court found
that the state had a strong interest in economy and efficiency, and therefore, in informal procedures. 9
After balancing what it considered to be the weakness of both Rael's
interests and his need for counsel against the state's strong interest in
rapid adjudication, the Rael court concluded that appointed counsel need
not be provided every time an indigent defendant faces incarceration in
a civil contempt hearing. The court also noted that the presumption of a
right to appointed counsel when the defendant faces incarceration is weaker
when the defendant holds the keys to his own prison. 6°
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to require that counsel be appointed in all civil contempt cases, it did hold that fundamental
fairness may require appointment of counsel in complex support proceedings. The supreme court left the trial courts to determine, on a caseby-case basis, when appointments were required. 6 The supreme court
instructed the trial judge to consider the indigent's ability to understand
the proceeding, the complexity of the legal and factual issues, and the
defenses that might be presented. 62 The supreme court also required that
the trial judge articulate the reasons for the decision of whether "fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel to 6assist
an indigent
3
defendant in a nonsupport civil contempt proceeding.
D. Analysis of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
1. Constitutional Background
A critical analysis of the reasoning of the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Rael begins most logically with consideration of the development of
the constitutional principles which underlie the right to counsel. In Argersinger v. Hamlin,64 the United States Supreme Court held that the
sixth amendment right to counsel applies to all criminal prosecutions if
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 643-44, 642 P.2d at 1102-03.
Id. at 644, 642 P.2d at 1103.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 645, 642 P.2d at 1104.
Id.
Id.
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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loss of liberty is involved.65 In Argersinger, an indigent pro se defendant
was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by
up to six months' imprisonment, and sentenced to ninety days in jail.
The -defendant brought a habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme
Court, which ruled that the fight to appointed counsel applied only to
trials for non-petty offenses. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed.
The Court, after examining the history of the sixth amendment, rejected
the argument that crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six
months may be tried without counsel because they may be tried without
a jury.' The Court held that "assistance of counsel is often a requisite
to the very existence of a fair trial." 67 Quoting from Gideon v. Wainwright,6" the Court acknowledged that the government has the lawyers
and the money to prosecute; resources that put the indigent defendant at
a great disadvantage unless counsel is appointed.69 Furthermore, a trial
that results in a short period of imprisonment is not necessarily less
complex than other trials." The Court concluded that "even in prosecutions for offenses less serious than felonies, a fair trial may require the
presence of a lawyer. "71

Seven years after Argersinger, in Scott v. Illinois," the Supreme Court
limited the Argersinger requirement of appointed counsel to cases where
the criminal proceeding actually leads to imprisonment. The Court stated
that the/central premise of Argersinger was that actual imprisonment was
"different in kind" from fines or a mere threat of imprisonment, and that
this difference warranted "adoption of actual imprisonment as the line
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." 73
65. Id. at 37. The Supreme Court did not consider whether the sixth amendment right to counsel
applied in cases where no loss of liberty was involved. Justice Powell, in his concurrence, suggested
that the requirement applied even if there was no possibility of imprisonment. Id. at 48.
66. Id. at 30-31. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), in which the Supreme Court held
that serious criminal contempts are subject to the jury trial provisions of the Constitution and only
petty contempts can be tried without a jury.
67. 407 U.S. at31.
68. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the United States Supreme Court held thatan indigent
defendant ina criminal trial had a fundamental right toassistance of counsel. The Court noted that
the fact "[t]hat government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have money hire lawyers
to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries." Id. at 344.
69. 407 U.S. at 32.
70. Id. at 33. The Court relied heavily on a report by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128 (1967),
as well as citing two other studies, Hellerstein, The Importance of the Misdemeanor Case on Trial
andAppeal, 28 The Legal Aid Brief Case 151, 152 (1970), and American Civil Liberties Union,
study concluded that
Legal Counsel for Misdemeanants, PreliminaryReport 1 (1970). The latter
"[m]isdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from police court with
all charges dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without counsel." 407 U.S. at 36.
71. 407 U.S. at 34 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967)).
72. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
73. Id. at 373.
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In Rael, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not apply the sixth amendment actual imprisonment standard set forth in Scott v. Illinois. Instead,
the court stated that the "sixth amendment right to counsel guarantee
applies only to criminal prosecutions," 7 4 so that it was first necessary to
determine whether the contempt proceeding was civil or criminal. The
court observed that the United States Supreme Court does not rely on the
label given to a proceeding, but looks at the nature of the proceeding,
the offense, and the punishment to determine whether the proceeding is
a criminal prosecution." The New Mexico Supreme Court did not apply
the sixth amendment right to counsel because it decided that the nature
of the contempt proceeding was civil and not criminal.
2. History of Civil and Criminal Contempt
The Rael court's analysis of civil versus criminal contempt rested on
a substantial history of state and federal decisions. The New Mexico
Supreme Court first recognized a difference between civil and criminal
contempt in 1910 in CostillaLand and Investment Co. v. Allen.76 Relying
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bessette v. Conkey
77
Co.,
the court stated that criminal contempts "preserve the power and
and punish disobedience of their
vindicate the dignity of the courts, ...
7
the rights of private parcontempt
preserves
orders." 1 In contrast, civil
ties, compels obedience to orders made to enforce those rights, and is
remedial and coercive. 9 Therefore, the objective of the contempt proceeding and the type of party being satisfied determine the nature of the
contempt. The Costilla court also stated that in doubtful cases, the court
should consider whether the contemnor is a party to the suit, whether the
contempt proceedings are before a final decree, and whether the fine
imposed is payable to the public or to an adverse litigant.8"
74. 97 N.M. at 642, 642 P.2d at 1101 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)).
75. 97 N.M. at 642, 642 P.2d at 1101 (citing Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976), and
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)). In Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976), the
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of right to counsel for petty offenses in a military
setting. In Middendorf, Marine Corps enlistees were allowed to choose between two procedures for
handling offenses: 1) summary court martial, in which the commanding officer acted as judge, fact
finder, defense counsel, and prosecutor, and the penalties ranged from forfeiture of two-thirds pay
for one month to brief imprisonment or 2) full court martial, in which there was a complete hearing
and right to counsel, and the penalties were much more stiff. Id. at 31-33. The enlistees brought an
action alleging that the summary court-martial proceeding violated their due process right to counsel.
The Supreme Court held that because the enlistees chose their court proceeding, there was no due
process violation. Id. at 47-48. Additionally, the Court held that the summary court martial was not
a criminal proceeding because the offenses involved had no common-law counterparts and there
were no similar civilian sanctions. Id. at 39.
76. 15 N.M. 528, 110 P. 847 (1910).
77. 194 U.S. 324 (1904).
78. 15 N.M. at 532, 110 P. at 848 (quoting Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 328 (1904)).
79. 15 N.M. at 532-33, 110 P. at 848 (quoting Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 328
(1904)).
80. 15 N.M. at 533, 110 P. at 849.
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A later New Mexico Supreme Court case, State v. Magee Publishing
Co.,8 suggested that each type of contempt involves different policy
considerations. In civil contempt proceedings, the objective is to enforce
performance deemed due by an adverse litigant. In criminal contempt
proceedings, however, the objective is to maintain obedience to the judicial process.82

In State v. Greenwood, 3 the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that
the key factor in determining the nature of the contempt is the purpose
for exercising the contempt power. The contempt is criminal if the primary
purpose is to preserve the court's authority and to punish for disobedience.
The contempt is civil if the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for
an injured litigant and to coerce compliance without a court order." The
Greenwood court also noted that "[t]he fact that the act with which a
defendant is charged in a contempt proceeding is also an indictable crime
has been relied on in holding a contempt criminal." 85
81. 29 N.M. 455, 224 P. 1028 (1924). In Magee, the court held that writing, printing, publishing,
and circulating newspaper articles, in which the conduct of a judge in a pending case was criticized,
constituted criminal contempt.
82. Id. at 470-71, 224 P. at 1029.
83. 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957). In Greenwood, the court held that a proceeding to punish
the defendant for contempt for violating an injunction against using water from wells drilled on his
land without a permit was a criminal contempt proceeding.
84. Id. at 159, 315 P.2d at 225.
85. Id. Of course, the New Mexico appellate courts have decided contempt cases in addition to
those discussed in the text. See, e.g., Gideon v. Gideon, 96 N.M. 315, 630 P.2d 267 (1981) (civil
contempt order against divorced husband for failure to return children to wife as scheduled); In re
Hooker, 94 N.M. 798, 617 P.2d 1313 (1980) (child custody case in which the court stated that the
elements necessary for a finding of civil contempt were knowledge of the court's order and an ability
to comply); Henderson v. Henderson, 93 N.M. 405, 600 P.2d 1195 (1979) (lower court found mother
in civil contempt for refusing father's visitation rights and mother appealed; supreme court held that
where there is a finding of contempt but no sentence is imposed, no appeal is available); In re
Klecan, 93 N.M. 637,603 P.2d 1094 (1979) (outlining requirements that must be met before summary
punishment is imposed for criminal contempt) Royal Int'l Optical Co. v. Texas State Optical Co.,
92 N.M. 237, 586 P.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1978) (civil contempt for continuing to use deceptively similar
trade name after being ordered to discontinue use); Lindsey v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 737, 568 P.2d
263 (Ct. App. 1977) (court determined that contempt for non-compliance with restraining order was
both civil and criminal); State v. Sanchez, 89 N.M. 673, 556 P.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1976) (it was
irrelevant whether contempt order against witness for refusing to answer was civil or criminal because
both could be tried in the same proceeding); Miller v. City of Albuquerque, 88 N.M. 324, 540 P.2d
254 (Ct. App. 1975) (civil contempt order against Assistant City Attorney for failing to produce
witnesses pursuant to court order upheld); Greer v. Johnson, 83 N.M. 334, 491 P.2d 1145 (1971)
(civil contempt for not removing second story of house, as ordered by the district court); International
Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Local 177, United Stone and Allied Products Workers, 74 N.M.
195, 392 P.2d 343 (1964) (civil contempt against a labor union for not complying with a restraining
order); New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Local 890, Int'l Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, 57 N.M.
617, 261 P.2d 648 (1953) (settlement of strike and withdrawal of picket line terminated jurisdiction
of court to continue trial and dispose of the civil contempt proceedings); Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M.
627, 261 P.2d 655 (1953) (court had jurisdiction to impose suspended sentence of imprisonment for
definite term for civil contempt).
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3. Civil Versus Criminal Contempt in Rael
In Rael, the New Mexico Supreme Court reiterated the factors established in previous contempt cases. The court used these factors to conclude
that Rael's contempt was civil. The court stressed that the most important
factor was the nature and purpose of the punishment. A close consideration
of the court's analysis, however, reveals substantial problems with its
conclusion.
The court first considered whether Rael's wrongful act also was an
indictable crime.86 The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed this issue

in State v. Greenwood87 and adopted the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning in Michaelson v. United States:88
[W]illful disobedience of any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district court of the United States ... by

doing any act or thing forbidden, if such act or thing be of such
character as to constitute also a criminal offense under any statute
of the United States or law of any State in which the act is committed,
shall be proceeded as in the statute provided. 9
Thus, if a defendant's disobedience also is a criminal offense, his rights
are those afforded in a criminal proceeding. Rael's case was an indictable
crime,' and therefore the court should have guaranteed him the same
right to counsel available to him in a criminal proceeding. Instead, the
Rael court merely stated that "[a]lthough Rael could have been criminally
prosecuted

. . .

the present proceeding is civil in nature." 9 The court's

one-sentence conclusion ignored both the Greenwood "indictable crime
factor" and its own admonition that the sixth amendment right to counsel
could not be based solely on the label given to the proceeding.92
In considering whether the contempt proceeding was separate and independent from the previous suit, the Rael court suggested that if the
court could enforce a finding that Rael was in contempt, regardless of
his eventual compliance with the court's previous order, then his interest
in an adequate defense at the hearing would be extremely important and
the contempt would be similar to criminal contempt. If the charge against
Rael disappeared upon compliance, however, then his interest in counsel
would not be as great and the contempt charge would be more like civil
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957).
266 U.S. 42 (1924).
Id. at 64.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-5-20 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
Id. at 642,642 P.2d at 1101.
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contempt.93 The Rael opinion assumes that the contempt charge against
Rael would not be enforced once he paid the child support. 94 This analysis
rests on two unknown factors: first, that the trial judge would dismiss the
contempt charge upon payment of the underlying support order, and
second, that the defendant has the ability to comply, that is, that the
defendant in fact holds the keys to his own prison.95
Under the third factor utilized to determine whether the contempt was
civil or criminal, the Rael court found that even though the state was
bringing the action, it was only an assignee of the mother.96 This distinction is important because if the state is exercising its police powers,
it has resources available to it that are not within an indigent defendant's
grasp. The court recognized that a defendant confronted by this power
would be denied a fair hearing if he did not have counsel. 97
In finding that the state was only an assignee, the court cited the dissent
in a Wisconsin Court of Appeals case, Brotzman v. Brotzman.9 8 The
Brotzman majority, however, found in circumstances almost identical to
Rael that the state was exercising its police powers even though it acquired
its interest by assignment, and that the indigent defendant was entitled
to counsel. The majority in Brotzman concluded that the state was not
merely an assignee, but the real party in interest." Similarly, in Rael,
the New Mexico Supreme Court should have recognized that the Department of Human Services was exerting the power of the state, and
had an interest in the litigation because the money it sought to collect
was to be paid to the state.
The New Mexico Supreme Court provided little explanation when it
decided that Rael's act of contempt was noncompliance with a court order
and was not done out of disrespect for the court. When a contemnor acts
out of disrespect, a court can order punishment, suggesting that the contempt was criminal. On the other hand, if a contemnor fails to obey a
court order and the court attempts to coerce compliance with a contempt
action, the contempt order is not punishment, but is civil in nature.
93. See, e.g., New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Local 890, Int'l Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers,
57 N.M. 617, 620-21, 261 P.2d 648, 652-53 (1953) (settlement of the strike and the withdrawal of
the picket line terminated the jurisdiction of the lower court to continue the trial and dispose of the
civil contempt proceedings); Canavan v. Canavan, 18 N.M. 640, 646, 139 P. 154, 155-56 (1914)
(a final decree dissolves a preliminary injunction and thereafter a litigant cannot be punished for
civil contempt for violation of the preliminary injunction prior to its dissolution).
94. "Because he 'has the keys to his own prison,' the defendant's liberty interest is not the fullblown liberty interest found in cases such as criminal cases." 97 N.M. at 644, 642 P.2d at 1103.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 161-83 for a discussion of the inability to comply defense.
96. Id. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
97. Id.
98. 91 Wis. 2d 335, __, 283 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Ct. App. 1979). In Brotzman, the district
attorney brought an action against the indigent former husband for support payments.
99. Id. at -, 283 N.W.2d at 601-02.
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Although the Rael court recognized a valid distinction, the record is not
clear that Rael's disobedience was an act of noncompliance and not an
act of disrespect. It could be that the failure to pay was motivated by the
most egregious disrespect for the judge or the court system. "
Under the final and most important factor, the nature and purpose of
the punishment, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the
punishment was clearly civil."0 ' The court stated that the remedial nature
of the punishment was clear because the amount specified in the order
to show cause was equal to what the defendant owed in support payments
and because it was payable to the Department of Human Services, not
to the court. In addition, the court noted that Rael held "the keys to his
prison" because he could avoid being held in contempt either by complying with the court's order or by showing his inability to comply.' 2 In
Rael's case, because the contempt was "remedial and for the benefit of
the complainant," and because the punishment was "made contingent
upon the defendant's compliance with the order of the court

..

,"

the

supreme court found that the proceeding was civil.° 3
The court's reasoning seems flawed, however, because in the case of
indigent defendants, incarceration for contempt cannot serve its coercive
purpose. By definition, an indigent has no money. Therefore, the contempt
will become punitive if the indigent cannot pay the judgment. Although
the court stated that the defendant also could avoid the contempt by
proving his inability to comply, this defense may not protect the indigent
contemnor. The New Mexico courts have not clearly articulated the elements of the defense of inability to comply. "0It is particularly unclear
whether someone who is unemployed but physically able to work will
be treated as unable to comply with the order to pay. Additionally, if the
indigent is not represented by an attorney, he may not be able to formulate
or prove this defense in court. The case histories do not reveal pro se
defendants who are sufficiently skilled to discuss with the courts their
ability to make payments.
4. New Mexico's Extension of the Rael Definition of Civil
Contempt
The reasoning of the Rael court in finding the potential incarceration
of an indigent contemnor to be a civil proceeding is troubling. It is hard
100. For instance, Rael twice failed to appear in court when properly ordered to do so, acts which
are traditionally treated as disrespect of the court and therefore criminal contempt.
101. 97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 642, 642 P.2d at 1101 (quoting International Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Local
177, United Stone and Allied Products Workers, 74 N.M. 195, 198, 392 P.2d 343, 345 (1964)).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 161-83.
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to reconcile this analysis with the reality that indigent contemnors are
spending lengthy periods of time locked up in jail.' 5 Their pre-hearing
incarcerations display many of the indicia of criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the incarceration of civil contemnors is not limited to prehearing incarceration and indefinite confinements to coerce compliance.
At times, contemnors are incarcerated for a definite period to punish them
for past contemptuous acts. 06
' Certainly in this situation the incarceration
seems punitive, yet the New Mexico Supreme Court recently has characterized even this type of confinement as civil rather than criminal. In
Niemyjski v. Niemyjski, °7 the court specifically found a punitive jail
sentence for a past nonpayment to be civil contempt.
The petitioner in Niemyjski instituted a contempt proceeding against
the respondent for failure to pay child support. At the hearing, the respondent was represented by counsel. The district court found respondent
to be in arrears in the amount of $1,300. The judge held the respondent
in contempt, imposed a ten-day jail sentence, fined him $500, and ordered
him to pay a portion of the petitioner's attorney's fees." 8 The respondent
appealed the jail sentence, arguing that he was denied due process and
that the court abused its discretion in imposing the jail sentence.
In considering the respondent's due process argument, the supreme
court ignored what they had said was the most important factor in determining whether a contempt proceeding was civil or criminal: the nature
and purpose of the punishment. Instead, the court treated Rael as holding
that "a contempt action for child support enforcement is civil and not
criminal. " " Relying on previous New Mexico cases,"10 the court found
that it was proper to impose a jail sentence for civil contempt, stating
that otherwise, "[a]ny person ordered to make payments could merely
ignore the court order until enforcement is sought, knowing he could not
be jailed for his refusal to obey the court order. We cannot follow such
illogical reasoning that strips the court of the authority to enforce its
orders.."..
105. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35 for statistics showing that pro se civil defendants
were incarcerated almost five times as long as those who were represented.
106. In the cases surveyed in Bemalillo County, at least seven involved fixed contempt sentences,
the longest of which was 45 days.
107. 98 N.M. 176, 646 P.2d 1240 (1982).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 177, 646 P.2d at 1241. In Niemyjski, the lower court had found the father in contempt
for not making support payments previously ordered by the court, and imposed a 10 day jail sentence.
See supra text accompanying note 108.
110. Murphy v. Murphy, 96 N.M. 401, 631 P.2d 307 (1981), Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M. 627,
261 P.2d 655 (1953), and New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Local 890, 57 N.M. 617, 261 P.2d 648 (1953).
111. 98 N.M. at 177, 646 P.2d at 1241. This result is contrary to extensive authority, including
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966). In
Shillitani, the Court specified that "the justification for coercive imprisonment as applied to civil
contempt depends upon the ability of the contemner to comply with the court's order . . . [A
contemner cannot] be confined [if] he has. . . no further opportunity to purge himself of contempt."
Id. at 371. See also, Skinner v. White, 505 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1974); Cliett v. Hammonds, 305 F.2d
565 (5th Cir. 1962).
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The dissent in Niemyjski pointed out that "Rael is not authority for a
broad assertion that all contempt actions in child support enforcement
are civil in nature," but instead, recognizes that it is "the nature of the
punishment [which] is critical. ""'2 As noted by the dissent, the Rael court
acknowledged that a contempt order, which preserves the authority of
the court, constitutes a criminal contempt." 3 The dissent asserted that
because the Niemyjski court had exercised its criminal contempt power
to deprive the father of his liberty, due process required that the father
be given all the rights and safeguards that accompany a criminal contempt
proceeding. 4
The disparity between the Rael and Niemyjski decisions, and the division between the majority and the dissent in Niemyjski, reveal that the
civil versus criminal contempt distinction is clouded. Despite sixty-three
years of case law since CostillaLand and Investment Co. v. Allen' setting
principles, guidelines, and policies that New Mexico district courts should
consider when handling a contempt charge, it is still difficult to distinguish
between a civil and a criminal contempt. This confusion is particularly
unfortunate because if a contempt is criminal, the court must proceed
with a sixth amendment right to counsel analysis when faced with unrepresented indigents; a finding of civil contempt permits the court to
forego the sixth amendment analysis altogether. "'
As the third case history demonstrates, an indigent, unrepresented
defendant may be sentenced to a jail term as punishment for contempt
of court. Although the trial judge may be careful to label the finding of
"willful contempt" as "civil," the impact of the punitive jail sentence is
indistinguishable from a criminal sanction. To inflict such punishment on
an indigent without affording him the assistance of counsel seems to
ignore the United States Supreme Court's statement in Lassiter that "[an
indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses,
he may be deprived of his personal liberty." '7
E. Analysis of the FourteenthAmendment Due Process Right to Counsel
1. Rael and the Due Process Right to Counsel
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment affords a second
constitutional basis for the right to counsel. ,' After determining that the
112. Id. at 178, 646 P.2d at 1242 (Easley, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 179, 646 P.2d at 1243 (Easley, C.J., dissenting).
115. 15 N.M. 528, 110 P. 847 (1910).
116. In Rael, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that because the proceeding before it was
a civil contempt proceeding and not a criminal prosecution, the sixth amendment right to counsel
was not implicated. 97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
117. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).
118. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law .... " U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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sixth amendment did not apply to the case before it, the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Rael spent the remainder of the opinion discussing
whether the due process clause gave Rael a right to appointed counsel in
order that he might receive a fair hearing." 9 The New Mexico Supreme
Court held that an indigent does not have a due process right to appointed
counsel under the fourteenth amendment-each time he faces civil contempt
charges that might subject him to imprisonment. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied almost exclusively on Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, 2oand did not consider the United States Supreme Court's
due process analysis in Little v. Streater.2 '
2. The Gault Decision and the Right to Counsel
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court decided In re Gault,122 a
juvenile delinquency case in which the judge committed the fifteen-yearold defendant to the state industrial school until he reached majority. The
defendant was not represented by counsel at the hearings. The Supreme
Court noted that a proceeding in which a court determines whether a
child is delinquent and subject to loss of liberty "is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution."' ' 1 3 The Court stated, therefore, that
although the juvenile proceeding is not criminal in nature and may be
labeled "civil,"
[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems
of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity
of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and
to prepare and submit it. The child "requires the guiding
24 hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."
The Gault Court concluded that because a juvenile's freedom may be
curtailed in delinquency proceedings, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required that the state notify both the child and his
parents of his right to representation, and that counsel be appointed if
they could not afford to hire an attorney. 125
119. 97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
120. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
121. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
122. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
123. Id. at 36.
124. Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). The Court noted that the commitment usually was a minimum of three years because the juvenile courts' jurisdiction was limited
to age 18 and under, and the courts committed juveniles until they reached the age of 21. 387 U.S.
at 36 n.60.
125. Id. at 41.
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3. Lassiter and the Due Process Right to Counsel
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 126 the United States
Supreme Court, relying in part on In re Gault, held that failure to appoint
counsel in a civil proceeding, which did not involve the threat of incarceration, was not a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Lassiter, the district court terminated the petitioner's
parental rights after a hearing at which she appeared without counsel. At
the time of the hearing, the petitioner was serving a twenty-five to forty
year sentence for second-degree murder. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals rejected the petitioner's claim that she was entitled to appointed
counsel under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because
she was indigent. 127 The state supreme court denied discretionary review,
and Lassiter sought a writ of certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court began its discussion with a consideration of its cases concerning the right to appointed counsel. The Court
cited In re Gault2 ' and Vitek v. Jones'29 for the proposition that it is "the
defendant's interest in personal freedom, and not simply the special Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel in criminal cases, which
triggers the right to appointed counsel."13° The Court noted that as the
defendant's liberty interest diminishes, his right to counsel diminishes so
that in a probation revocation hearing a previously sentenced individual
has no per se right to appointed counsel. 3 ' The Court also noted that
' there is no right to appointed counsel in criminal
under Scott v. Illinois,32
proceedings that do not result in a loss of liberty. Based on these cases,
the Court found that there was a "presumption that an indigent litigant
has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived
of his physical liberty."' 3 3 The Court then observed that "[t]he case of
Mathews v. Eldridge'34 propounds three elements to be evaluated in deciding what due process requires, viz., the private interests at stake, the
government's interests, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to
erroneous decisions."' 35 The Court noted that it must balance these ele126. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
127. Id. at 24.
128. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
129. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Vitek, four of the five justices who reached the merits held that an
indigent prisoner was entitled to appointed counsel before being transferred involuntarily to a state
mental hospital.
130. 452 U.S. at 25.
131. Id. at 26. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972).
132. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
133. 452 U.S. at 26-27.
134. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
135. 452 U.S. at 27.
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ments against each other and against the presumption that there is no
right to appointed counsel if liberty is not at stake.
In Lassiter, the Court stated that in some cases the parents' interest
might be strong enough, the state's interests weak enough, and the risk
of error great enough to overcome the presumption that there is no right
to appointed counsel unless there is a deprivation of liberty. The Mathews
factors might not always be so distributed, however, and therefore, the
Court could not find that the due process clause required appointment of
' As with the probation
counsel in every parental termination proceeding. 36
revocation cases, the Court left the decision to the trial courts on a caseby-case basis.' 37 In Ms. Lassiter's case, the Court determined that the
presence of counsel would not have mattered because the hearing was
not complex, and it was evident that the petitioner had little interest in
her child.' 38
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, the Rael court noted that although there is an historical
presumption in favor of appointment of counsel if there is a deprivation
of liberty, the right diminishes as the defendant's liberty interest diminishes. The court ignored the fact that Lassiter did not involve a deprivation
of a liberty interest. Instead, the court used Lassiter as a springboard to
find that Rael's right to appointed counsel was diminished because he
would lose his liberty only if he had the ability to pay and failed to
comply. "' Inextricably linked with the court's analysis was its assumption
136. Id. at 31-32.
137. Id. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun used the Eldridge analysis. He first argued that freedom
of choice in matters of family life has been viewed as a fundamental liberty interest, the loss of
which triggers the right to appointed counsel under the due process clause. Secondly, he argued that
the proceeding resembled a criminal prosecution, involved complex legal issues, and therefore the
risk of error was great. Third, Justice Blackmun argued that the state's interest in informality and
avoiding cost and administrative inconvenience did not tip the scales against providing counsel.
138. One other case related to the constitutional background of the due process right to counsel.
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the United States Supreme Court considered "whether
an indigent probationer or parolee has a due process right to be represented by appointed counsel .
at a preliminary and final revocation hearing. Id. at 783.
The Supreme Court held that states should adopt a case-by-case approach to furnishing counsel
at probation or parole revocation proceedings. 411 U.S. at 790. The Court first rejected the argument
that no counsel shouldbe provided because the hearings alone were sufficient protection against due
process violations. The Court noted that the effectiveness of the hearing might depend on skills that
a probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess. Id. at 786. The Court also rejected the argument that
there was a constitutional duty to provide counsel for indigents, noting that such a rule would lead
to increased costs and would result in a more trial-like proceeding. Id. at 787-88.
In support of its conclusion, the Court noted that there are "critical differences between criminal
trials and probation or parole revocation hearings .... "Id. at 788-89. Additionally, the Court noted
that a probationer or parolee possesses more limited due process rights than an accused in a criminal
proceeding because he has already been convicted of a crime. Id. at 789. The Court added that
counsel should be provided if the probationer or parolee claims he did not commit the violation or
if there are complex reasons justifying the violation. Additionally, whether the probationer "appears
to be capable of speaking effectively for himself," was an important consideration. Id. at 791.
139. 97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
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that the defendant held the keys to his own prison, which made the case
unlike criminal cases where the defendant has no control over his destiny.'"
The court's rejection of a liberty interest in civil contempt proceedings
affected two parts of its analysis. First, the rejection undermined the
Lassiter presumption in favor of appointment of counsel where there is
loss of liberty. 141 Second, the Rael court's conclusion weakened it's per42
ception of the importance of the defendant's personal liberty interest,
and allowed it to treat the defendant's inability to comply defense as a
simple issue on which counsel would not enhance the accuracy of the
decision-making process. 141
4. Little v. Streater and the Rael Decision
On the same day that the United States Supreme Court rendered the
Lassiter decision, so heavily relied upon by the Rael court to limit the
right to counsel, the Supreme Court also decided Little v. Streater.'44The
reasoning of this case seems important to the Rael analysis of due process
interests, yet it was not considered by the Rael court. In Streater, the
Court held that a state could not deny an indigent defendant in a paternity
action free blood grouping tests without violating the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 45 The Court first discussed factors in the
case that it determined had a bearing on the indigent's due process claim.
First, the Court noted that the state's involvement was considerable because the mother, in order to continue to receive welfare, had to disclose
the name of the putative father and initiate a paternity suit in which the
state's attorney general automatically became a party.'" Next, the Supreme Court stated that the nature of the proceedings "bears heavily" on
the due process claim because the proceedings have "quasi-criminal overtones."' 4 7 The Court found these overtones in the state statute which
stated that if a court found paternity, it should charge the father with
support, and could punish him by imprisonment if he failed to comply
with the order.'48 Finally, the Court considered the "unusual evidentiary
obstacle" facing the defendant because he must overcome the49 plaintiff's
primafacie case by evidence other than his own testimony. 1
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 644, 642 P.2d at1103.
Id.
Id. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
Id. at 644, 642 P.2d at 1103.
452 U.S. 1 (1981).
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 10-12.
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After considering these factors, the Court applied the Mathews balancing test. In applying the first element, the Court found that the father
had a substantial interest in avoiding a support obligation, a liberty interest
which would be threatened if he did not comply, and an interest in
accurately determining the parent-child relationship. 5 ° The Court also
found a considerable risk of an erroneous decision if the blood test evidence was not available. Finally, the Court found that the state possessed
only a minimal financial interest in avoiding the cost of the test.
The Supreme Court concluded that an indigent defendant who opposed
the state in a paternity suit, and who had to overcome a heavy evidentiary
burden, lacked "a meaningful opportunity to be heard" if he did not
receive aid in obtaining the blood test. 5 ' Although Streater involved the
right to blood grouping tests and not the right to counsel, the Court's
analysis under the Mathews balancing test and its consideration of three
additional factors indicate the range of elements the Court is willing to
consider in a civil case where liberty issues may be at stake. The case
of Little v. Streater was not discussed by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Rael. This omission is unfortunate because many of the factors considered in Streater seem applicable to Rael. First, the Streater decision
found the state's "considerable" and "manifest" involvement in the paternity action to be an important factor.' 52 In contrast, in Rael the court
dismissed the fact that the State of New Mexico brought the action, saying
it was merely an assignee. The Rael court also discounted the state's
superior resources, claiming that the contempt proceedings were so simple
that the state would not have to "rely to any great extent on its superior
fact-gathering abilities."' 53 The Rael court did not discuss the fact that
the payments sought were to be made to the state, not to the mother,
another indication of state involvement which was significant in the Streater case.
The Supreme Court in Streater also considered it important that although the paternity proceedings were characterized by the state as civil,
they had quasi-criminal overtones.' 54 This also seems strikingly similar
to Rael, where the defendant faced the possibility of imprisonment."'
Although both the New Mexico statutes and those considered in Streater'56
call for possible imprisonment as punishment for contempt, and although
the United States Supreme Court characterized the proceeding before it
as quasi-criminal, the Rael court refused to reach a similar conclusion.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
452 U.S. 1.
97 N.M. at 644, 642
See Conn. Gen. Stat.
97 N.M. at 643, 642
See N.M. Stat. Ann.

P.2d at 1103.
§§46b-171, 46b-215, and 53-304 (1981).
P.2d at 1102.
§§40-5-20 to -21 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
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Finally, the Streater Court's application of the Mathews v. Eldridge'5 7
balancing test may give more accurate guidance than the Rael court found
in Lassiter. In weighing the private interests involved, the Streater Court
found a substantial "liberty interest threatened by possible sanctions for
non-compliance. "'58 Although the Rael court declared that it considered
the defendant's liberty interest to be "extremely important," the court
discounted this interest because the defendant was not prosecuted criminally, and consequently he held the keys to his prison.159 The United
States Supreme Court in Streater, however, did not diminish the liberty
interest of the defendant, as did the Rael court, when it dealt with similar
contempt and paternity statutes. "
It seems, therefore, that even though Streater was not a contempt
proceeding for nonpayment of child support, its identification and balancing of important factors and interests are relevant to the issues in Rael.
The blood samples at issue in Streater were no more critical to the fact
finding process involved than was the ability to establish a factual defense
to the allegations against Rael. The Streater factors suggest another approach to the question presented in Rael; one which might have altered
the court's conclusion regarding the indigent's fourteenth amendment
right to appointed.counsel.
F. The Difficulty of Presenting the Defense of Inability to Comply
Pro Se
The Rael decision leaves the courts free to determine the need for
assigned counsel on a case-by-case basis. The rationale for this limitation
of the due process right to counsel is that "[g]enerally the legal and
factual issues in a contempt hearing are not complex."'' Thus, Rael
instructs the trial judge to determine whether the defendant can understand
the proceedings, whether there are complex issues, and whether there are
defenses which might require the assistance of counsel. 62
' The survey of
cases in Bernalillo County163 did not reveal a single instance in which a
Rael inquiry was held or counsel was assigned. " Had the mandated
procedures been followed, and Rael inquiries been held, it may be that
all indigent pro se defendants would have received counsel because of
the confusion and complexity surrounding the inability to comply defense.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
452 U.S. at 13.
97 N.M. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46b-171, 46b-215, 52-304 (1981).
Id. at 644, 642 P.2d at 1103.
Id. at 645, 642 P.2d at 1104.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
See infra text accompanying notes 257-68.
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The inability to comply defense is a defendant's major answer to an
allegation of civil contempt. The defense asserts that the defendant is
unable to comply with the court's order. In most of the reported New
Mexico civil contempt cases, the defendants attempted to excuse their
liability on the grounds that they could not do what was required of them.
Unfortunately, this defense has received different treatment from the courts
at different times in its development, and so its scope and elements are
unclear.
In re Jaramillo'65 is the earliest reported case in which inability to
comply with a court order was used as a defense. The New Mexico
Supreme Court found that the defendants were unable to comply with
the court's order and that there was no basis for holding them in contempt.
The court described the defense as follows:
If it appears that the debtor is unable to pay the sum ordered to be
paid, that may be deemed a sufficient excuse, when he appears to
answer for apparent contumacy. Courts will not adjudge a defendant
in contempt for not doing an impossibility, nor for not doing what
is not in his power to do, unless he has voluntarily disabled himself
to do the act, when the creation of the disability was itself a contumacious act. "
Jaramillo demonstrates that the success of the defendant's inability to
comply defense ultimately depends on whether the failure to perform is
caused by some voluntary act of the defendant.' 67 Defining inability and
drawing the line between voluntary and non-voluntary acts are problems
with which the New Mexico courts have struggled, producing inconsistent
results.
' the New Mexico Supreme Court considered
In Andrews v. McMahan, 68
the voluntary act problem. The former wife brought a civil contempt
proceeding to enforce a court order against the husband for alimony and
child support. The issue facing the court was whether the husband's willful
decision not to work preempted his inability to pay defense. Specifically,
the court addressed the argument that even though the husband had no
property, he was able to work and should be found in contempt and
imprisoned. 169
The court was not persuaded, and instead relied on the California
Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Todd,'70 which stressed that where
165. 8 N.M. 598, 45 P. 1110 (1896).
166. Id. at 611-12, 45 P. at 1114 (quoting Myers v. Trimble, 3 E.D. Smith 612).
167. See Nelson v. Nelson, 82 N.M. 324, 481 P.2d 403 (1971), Armijo v. Armijo, 29 N.M. 15,
217 P. 623 (1923), and Ex parte Canavan, 17 N.M. 100, 130 P. 248 (1912), in which the New
Mexico Supreme Court stated that the contemnor must affirmatively show his inability to make the
payments required of him.
168. 43 N.M. 87, 85 P.2d 743 (1938).
169. Id. at 93, 85 P.2d at 749; see also Going v. Going, 148 Tenn. 522, 256 S.W. 890 (1923).
170. 119 Cal. 57, 50 P. 1071 (1897).
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the defendant has no money or property, and is able but unwilling to
work, it is difficult to understand how imprisonment would enhance his
ability to pay. The Andrews court adopted the California view, perhaps
because of the economic conditions of the Depression. The court concluded:
We take judicial cognizance of the industrial condition of the country
and particularly of this state. The Department of Labor reports that
millions of trained workers are unemployed. The court's finding that
the appellant had the ability and strength to do certain kinds of work
is not coupled with findings or evidence that the appellant (who
evidently would be rated in the lowest class of workers) could find
employment. There is no evidence whatever that appellant has the
pecuniary ability to comply with the judgement for support money. 7 '
Three years later the mood of the court changed. In Wilson v. Wilson, 172
as in Andrews, the defendant had failed to pay child support. The defendant was unemployed and in poor physical condition. Yet, because
there was evidence that he was receiving rents from property, the court
upheld the trial court's conclusion that the defendant was trying "to thwart
the carrying out of the purposes of the terms of the decree."' 7 3 Additionally, the Wilson court appeared to put a greater burden on the defendant
attempting to prove inability to pay: "The duty rests upon appellant to
exhaust his every reasonable resource. . . . It is not enough that he offer
mere possible excuses for his failure to meet this obligation; he must offer
good and reasonable ones ... ."'174
7 the 'New Mexico
In Sears v. Sears,"'
Supreme Court found -the fact
that the appellant did not have the money he was ordered to pay or "the
means of securing the money with which to pay such sum"' 176 to be
sufficient evidence of inability to pay alimony. Additionally, the court
stated that the appellant could not be found to be currently in contempt
if in the past he had possessed the ability to comply and had not done
177
so.
In contrast, the supreme court in Nelson v. Nelson 78 held that the
husband's sentence for contempt was not improper based upon his asserted
inability to pay community debts. The court considered the fact of the
husband's unemployment since the decree to be merely evidentiary. The
court refused to accept the inability to pay defense'79 because the testimony
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

43 N.M. at 94, 85 P.2d at 747.
45 N.M. 224, 114 P.2d 737 (1941).
Id. at 230, 114 P.2d at 740.
Id. at 227-28, 114 P.2d at 739.
43 N.M. 142, 87 P.2d 434 (1939).
Id. at 145, 87 P.2d at 436.
Id.
82 N.M. 324, 481 P.2d 403 (1971).
Id. at 327, 481 P.2d at 406.
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showed that the husband had not complied with an order to sell separate
property and apply the proceeds to the debt.
Niemyjski v. Niemyjski, 8 although decided after Rael, provides an
example of the New Mexico Supreme Court's present attitude toward the
inability to comply defense, particularly in child support cases. In this
case, the court considered the respondent's argument that the lower court
had abused its discretion in imposing a jail sentence because he was
unable to pay child support. The court quickly disposed of this issue,
finding that there was sufficient evidence that the father financially was
able to comply. The court's response to the father's claim that he used
all of his funds for business and personal living expenses was reminiscent
of the court's discussion forty-two years earlier in Wilson v. Wilson."'t
The Niemyjski court scolded the father, stating that if he spent his funds
for his own expenses, "it was bad judgment on his part and clearly a
willful violation of his obligation. It is unfortunate that he ignored his
82
most importantsingle obligation, namely the support of his minor child.",
From these cases, it appears that a present lack of resources is not
enough to establish the inability to comply defense. The court also looks
at the ability to work and the disposition of all available resources and
180. 98 N.M. 176, 646 P.2d 1240 (1982).
181. 45 N.M. 224, 114 P.2d 737 (1941).
182. 98 N.M. at 177, 646 P.2d at 1241 (emphasis in original). A recent United States Supreme
Court case, Bearden v. Georgia, 103 S. Ct. 2064 (1983), may cast some additional light on the
inability to comply defense. In Bearden, the defendant was found guilty of burglary and receiving
stolen property, and was sentenced to probation on the condition that he pay a $500 fine and $250
in restitution, with $100 payable that day, $100 the next day, and the $550 balance within four
months. The petitioner paid the first $200, but was then laid off from his job. He tried, but could
not find, other work and had no income or assets during this period. Id. The trial court revoked his
probation for failure to pay the balance and sentenced the petitioner to serve the remaining time of
the probationary period in prison. id. at 2066. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision and the Georgia Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court held that if the trial judge determines that a fine is the appropriate penalty
for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison the defendant solely because he lacks the resources to
pay the fine. Id. at 2068-71. The Court stated that the reason for nonpayment is of critical importance.
If the probationer had the means to pay, but willfully refused or had made no effort to obtain the
funds, the state was justified in using imprisonment as a sanction. On the other hand, if the probationer
had made reasonable efforts to pay, but could not do so through no fault of his own, it was
"fundamentally unfair" to put him in jail without determining whether alternative methods of
punishment were available. Id.
The Court noted that if the judge did not inquire into the reasons for failure to pay and alternative
methods of punishment, and if the probationer was not willfully disobedient, the court would be
depriving the probationer of his conditional freedom merely because he could not pay through no
fault of his own. The Supreme Court stated that "[s]uch a deprivation would be contrary to the
fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 2071-72.
Analogizing Bearden to the child support cases, the state clearly has a strong interest in enforcing
child support orders, and imprisonment might be an effective means of satisfying that interest. The
Bearden decision suggests, however, that alternative methods of punishment should be considered
before imprisonment, despite the state's interest in punishment and deterrence.
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examines these questions with a jaundiced eye. A father's failure to
support his children is offensive to the court, so his explanations must
be sufficient to withstand highly critical scrutiny. To present such a defense
pro se is difficult indeed. It seems more likely that the indigent defendant
never will understand the concerns of the court, and never will present
information about efforts to find employment, general employability, total
available resources, and the way that these resources were spent in the
past. An attorney, understanding the significance of this information, can
help the client ferret out the information. An attorney also can document
employment difficulties, consult experts if necessary, and explain how
the father has used his available resources in the past. 183
IV. DECISIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS ON RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
A. State Cases Recognizing a Right to Counsel in Child Support Cases
A survey of cases dealing with the issue of right to appointed counsel
in contempt proceedings for child support demonstrates that the New
Mexico Supreme Court's opinion in Rael is a distinctly minority view.
The majority of the state and federal courts which have considered the
issue either expressly or implicitly have found the existence of a right to
appointed counsel. Moreover, the majority of federal and state courts
considering other types of contempt cases in which incarceration may
result also have recognized the right to appointed counsel. These decisions
are based primarily on the threat of incarceration, with many being influenced by the involvement of the state as a party to the proceedings or
a representative of a party.
In McNabb v. Osmundson, "4 the Iowa Supreme Court held that an
indigent. charged with contempt for nonpayment of child support had a
fourteenth amendment right to counsel at a hearing which ordered his
incarceration. The court first refused to make the civil versus criminal
contempt distinction because "Iltihe jail doors clang with the same finality
behind an indigent who is held in contempt and incarcerated for nonpayment of child support . . . as they do behind an indigent who is
incarcerated for violation of a criminal statute.' 85 Although the court
183. Assignment of counsel to indigent fathers might even increase the amount of child support
collected by the state. It may be that the lawyer would be the first person to take the time to help
the father understand his obligations and the lengths the state will go to enforce them. As in criminal
cases, some attorneys may even assist the client in locating employment. Therefore, the additional
cost of assigning counsel can bring a financial return to the state, both in monies collected and in
reducing days of incarceration which costs approximately $40 per person per day.
184. 315 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1982).
185. Id. at 11. Iowa Code Ann. § 598.23 (1981) provides as follows: "If any party against whom
any ... final decree has been entered shall willfully disobey the same, or secrete his property, he
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primarily looked to the due process protections of the fourteenth amendment, it also recognized the sixth amendment decisions of the United
86
States Supreme Court. The court looked to Argersinger v. Hamlin" and
Scott v. Illinois1"7 because in these cases the Supreme Court made no
distinction between the sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to coun89
' The court distinguished Lassiterv. Department ofSocial Services,
sel. 88
and did not utilize the balancing analysis set forth in that case because
Lassiter did not involve a deprivation of liberty."9
In Brotzman v. Brotzman, 9 ' the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that
an indigent defendant was entitled to court-appointed counsel in a civil
contempt action initiated by the district attorney. The court relied on a
recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case' 92 in which that court held that
where a state exercises its police power in a civil contempt proceeding,
93
the indigent contemnor is entitled to appointed counsel.' The Wisconsin
Supreme Court required that prior to a civil contempt hearing in which
the defendant's liberty is threatened, "the court . . . must advise the
alleged contemnor of his right to counsel and advise him that if he 94is
indigent, the court will appoint counsel for him at public expense.""'
The Brotzman court specifically found that because the district attorney
had brought the suit and was an agent of the state, he was the real party
in interest to the proceeding. The court noted that if the district attorney
there
had chosen to commence a criminal action instead of a civil action, 95
amendment.'
sixth
the
under
counsel
appointed
to
a
right
be
would
In Tetro v. Tetro,'96 the Washington Supreme Court held that indigent
persons have the right to appointed counsel whenever a contempt hearing
may result in a jail sentence. The court noted that under Argersinger v.
Hamlin,9' 7 the sixth amendment right to counsel applied to criminal cases.
may be cited and punished by the court for contempt and be committed to the county jail for a
period of time not to exceed thirty days for each offense."
The court's refusal to distinguish between the two contempts seemed to be based on the severity
of the potential sentence. 315 N.W.2d at 11. Additionally, the punitive and indirectly coercive nature
of the sentence led the court to hold that the inability to comply defense had no application in its
jurisdiction.
186. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
187. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
188. 315 N.W.2d at 13. The court also cited In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), for its holding
under the fourteenth amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
189. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
190. 315 N.W.2d at 14.
191. 91 Wis. 2d 335, 283 N.W.2d. 600 (1979).
192. Ferris v. State ex rel. Maass, 75 Wis. 2d 542, 249 N.W.2d 789 (1977).
193. Id. at 546, 249 N.W.2d at 791.
194. 91 Wis. 2d. at -. , 283 N.W.2d at 791.
195. 91 Wis. 2d at 336, 283 N.W.2d at 601. The court cited, inter alia, Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
196. 86 Wash. 2d. 252, 544 P.2d 17 (1975).
197. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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The court acknowledged the difficulties in distinguishing between a criminal, quasi-criminal, and civil proceeding. Although the court recognized
the proceedings before it as quasi-criminal, it considered the determining
factor to be the possibility that the defendant would be incarcerated: "[t]he
grim reality of a threatened jail sentence overshadows the technical distinctions. . . and demands that the protection of legal advice in advocacy
be given all persons faced with it. "98
In Otton v. Zaborac,,'the Alaska Supreme Court also held that there
was a right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings. The rationale of
the decision was that the potential deprivation of liberty required due
process protections of the interests involved.2 °" Additionally, the Otton
court, relying on Argersinger v. Hamlin,2 ° ' noted that the right to a jury
trial would have little value unless a defendant was represented by counsel. 2 °2 Citing Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, the
Alaska court observed:
A defendant who is deprived of his liberty by civil process is as
much entitled to due process of law as a defendant who is deprived
of his liberty because he is charged with a crime. The mesne process
of civil arrest without opportunity
to be heard with the assistance of
20 3
counsel is not due process.

Thus, these decisions primarily look to the reality of incarceration in
finding a right to assigned counsel, a line of reasoning rejected by the
Rael court. They also reject the civil-criminal distinction as meaningless
when jail is threatened, and acknowledge the significance of the state's
involvement. 2' Again, despite their persuasive power, these factors were
discounted by the Rael court.
198. 86 Wash. 2d at __ 544 P.2d at 19. The Tetro decision preceded Scott v.Illinois,
440 U.S.
367 (1979), and therefore would be limited to cases where the defendant actually is imprisoned.
199. 525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974).
200. Id. at 538.
201. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
202. 525 P.2d at 540.
203. Id. at539 (citing In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 152, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340, (1968)).
204. In addition to the cases cited in the text, the following state cases recognized a right to
counsel in child support cases. In Chase v. Chase, 287 Md. 472, 413 A.2d 208 (1980), the Maryland
Court of Appeals dismissed two appeals because the purging of the defendants' contempt rendered
the matters moot. It is significant to note, however, that three of the five judges explicitly recognized
that "due process requires the appointment of counsel for indigents in civil contempt proceedings
if they are sentenced to imprisonment." Id. at 216.
In People ex rel. Amendola v. Jackson, 74 Misc. 2d 797, 346 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1973),
the New York Supreme Court in Westchester County ruled that all respondents who appear before
the family court for alleged violation of its support orders must be informed at the beginning that
they have the right to appointed counsel if they cannot afford private counsel. Although the Family
Court Act, Part 3, Act 4, § 433, provides for the right to counsel, the court extended that right to
include court-appointed counsel. The Jackson court reasoned that although it was considering a civil
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B. Other State Contempt Cases Recognizing the Right to Counsel
Various state courts also have found a right to court-appointed counsel
in civil proceedings other than contempt proceedings for child support.
All of these cases involve the same consideration present in Rael: the
right to appointed counsel when a contempt proceeding may possibly
result in a deprivation of liberty.
In State ex rel. Graves v. Daugherty,2 "5 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that indigent defendants in paternity proceedings be provided with court-appointed counsel."0 6 The court relied on the federal
expansion of the right to counsel,2"7 West Virginia's own constitutionally
based right to appointed counsel in criminal and civil actions which may
constrain a defendant's liberty,2"8 and the fact that there are "significant
liberty and property consequences of a paternity determination requir[ing]
utmost due process protection."2

A year before Daugherty, the California Supreme Court decided a
similar issue in Salas v. Cortez.2"' The court held that the federal and
state guarantees of due process require appointment of counsel to indigent
defendants in paternity proceedings where the state appears as a party or
contempt proceeding," [i]t is a peculiar sophistry that commands attention to the distinction between
civil and criminal proceedings when, at the end of either, the commitment to a jail cell looms before
the accused." 74 Misc. 2d at __ 346 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Hendrick, 220 Pa. Super. 225, 283 A.2d 722 (Pa. Super.
1971), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that in a civil contempt proceeding for failure to comply
with a support order, an indigent is entitled as a matter of due process to the assistance of counsel.
Id. at -, 283 A.2d at 723-24. The court relied on the developing Supreme Court law of contempt
and equal protection of indigents.
In Texas, the Court of Civil Appeals has heard two cases on the issue of right to appointed counsel
at a contempt proceeding. See Ex parte Wilson, 559 S.W.2d 698 (Civ. App. 1977) and Ex parte
Andrews, 566 S.W.2d 668 (Civ. App. 1978). In both cases, the court did not decide the issue,
finding that the defendant did not prove that he was indigent. In Ex parte Wilson, the court characterized the proceeding as criminal constructive contempt, noted that the Texas Supreme Court
considers all contempt proceedings to be criminal in nature, and found the defendant's argument
for a sixth amendment right to counsel persuasive. 559 S.W.2d at 700-01.
205. 266 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va. 1980).
206. Id. at 144-45. The court also decided that indigent defendants who moved the court for
blood-grouping tests were entitled to have the state bear the cost. Id. at 146-47.
207. Id. at 144. The court cited In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972).
208. 266 S.E.2d at 144. The court cited Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe, 220 S.E.2d 672
(W. Va. 1975), which held that there was a right to court-appointed counsel in contempt proceedings.
The court had also found the right to appointed counsel in State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d
109 (1974) (involuntary civil mental health commitment proceedings); Bulett v. Staggs, 250 S.E.2d
38 (W. Va. 1978) (violation of municipal ordinances); State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 157 W. Va.
590, 203 S.E.2d 140 (1974) (civil child neglect proceedings), and Wilson v. Bambrick, 156 W. Va.
703, 195 S.E.2d 721 (1973) (civil juvenile proceedings).
209. 266 S.E.2d at 145.
210. 24 Cal. 2d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979).
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brings the case on behalf of the mother.2 ' The court noted that the right
did not depend on whether the action was labeled criminal or civil, but
on the interests involved and the nature of the proceedings." 2 Unlike
Daugherty, the California court emphasized the state's involvement and
the fact 1that
the defendant opposed a full panoply of the state's re3
sources. 2

In People v. Lucero,21 4 the Colorado Supreme Court considered a contempt proceeding involving a witness who refused to testify before a
grand jury. The court held that the right to counsel extended to all contempt
proceedings, whether civil or criminal, which resulted in imprisonment.
The court did not state whether an indigent had the right to appointed
counsel, although the court's reliance on Argersinger v. Hamlin215 would
suggest such a right to be included in its holding.21 6
C. Federal Cases Recognizing a Right to Appointed Counsel in
Support Cases
In Mastin v. Fellerhoff,2 '7 the court held that the domestic relations
court could not incarcerate indigent persons for nonpayment of child
support without appointing counsel to represent them. 2 8 The court held
that such a practice violated the due process guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment regardless of the nature of the proceedings. 21 9 The court
22°
rejected the argument that Lassiter v. Department of Social Services
required it to adopt a case-by-case approach to appointment of counsel.
The court distinguished Lassiter because the petitioner in Mastin was
threatened with a loss of physical liberty. 22 ' The Mastin court stated that
211. Id. at

-_, 593 P.2d at 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 537. Other cases requiring court-appointed

counsel in paternity actions include the following: Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1979);
M. v. S., 169 N.J. Super. 209, 404 A.2d 653 (1979); Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799 (Alaska
1977); and Artibee v. Chaboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 243 N.W.2d 248 (1976).

212. 24 Cal. 3d at __, 593 P.2d at 229, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
213. Id. at -,
593 P.2d at 231, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 534. See also Quezada v. Superior Court,
171 Cal. App. 2d 528, 340 P.2d 1018 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959), a support case in which a California

district court stated that a party to a civil contempt proceeding is entitled to the same protection of
his constitutional rights as though it were a criminal proceeding.
214. 196 Colo. 276, 584 P.2d 1208 (1978).
215. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).

216. 584 P.2d at 1214.
217. 526 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
218. Id. at 972-73. The court stated that it need not abstain from deciding the merits of the case.
The court found that when the Ohio Supreme Court decided there was no sixth amendment right to
appointed counsel, it necessarily rejected the argument of right to appointed counsel under the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 971. For the Ohio Supreme Court decision, see In re Calhoun, 47
Ohio St. 2d 15, 350 N.E.2d 665 (1976).

219. 526 F. Supp. at 972-73.
220. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).

221. 526 F. Supp. at 972.
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appointment of counsel was an absolute requirement.of due process whenever the proceeding may result in imprisonment,222 and that the balancing
test applied in Lassiter should be utilized only when the right to counsel
is not absolute. The court also noted that even if it had applied a balancing
test, the private liberty interests far outweighed the state's interests in
efficient adjudication, and the risk that the procedures employed by the
state would result in an erroneous decision was so great "that a right to
appointed counsel clearly exist[ed] in all cases." 223
In Henkel v. Bradshaw,224 the Ninth Circuit abstained from deciding
the merits of a case in which an indigent father, cited for contempt for
not paying support, sought injunctive and declaratory relief from the state
trial court's refusal to appoint counsel.225 Although the court denied relief,
the opinion stated that " [t]he state trial judge, now cognizant of Argersinger, will most assuredly know that if a lawyer is not appointed for
Henkel's representation, Henkel cannot be confined even if found to have
been contemptuous." 226
Finally, in Schultz v. Helm,227 a Wisconsin District Court held that
counsel did not have to be appointed at a hearing in which the fact of
indigency is being determined.228 Relying on Argersinger v. Hamlin,229
however, the court noted that "[a] finding of indigency would have entitled him to representation by appointed counsel at a contempt hear"1230
ing .. . .
D. Other Federal Contempt Cases Recognizing the Right to Counsel
The federal courts also have considered the right to appointed counsel
in civil cases other than contempt proceedings for child support. Like the
state decisions, these cases treat the threat of incarceration as a basis for
recognizing a right to counsel.
In United States v. Anderson,23 1 the contemnor had failed to comply
with a court order requiring production of certain records. The court held
222. Id. at 973. The court's statement is partially incorrect under Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979), in which the United States Supreme Court held that imprisonment actually must result for
the right to apply.
223. 526 F. Supp. at 973. An Ohio district court reached the same conclusion as the Mastin court
in an earlier case, except the Ohio court relied on the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. See Young
v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
224. 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973).
225. Id. at 1390.
226. Id. at 1389.
227. 368 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Wis. 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974).
228. Id. at 424-25.
229. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
230. 368 F. Supp. at 425. In another abstention case the court cited, inter alia, Leonard v.
Leonard, 207 Tenn. 609, 341 S.W.2d 740 (1960), and Bowdon v. Bowdon, 198 Tenn. 143, 278
S.W.2d 670 (1955).
231. 553 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1977).
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that "[a] person charged with civil or criminal contempt is entitled to
have counsel present . . . ." and that an indigent is entitled to appointed
counsel if the indigent is faced with the possibility of incarceration,
regardless of whether the proceeding is labeled civil or criminal.232
In In re Kilgo,233 the Fourth Circuit also considered a civil contempt
case involving a grand jury witness. The court held that the indigent
contemnor was entitled to appointed counsel at the contempt hearing but
not at the immunity hearing. 234 Similarly, in United States v. Sun Kun
King,235 the Ninth Circuit held that an indigent witness is entitled to
appointed counsel in a civil contempt proceeding based on the witness'
refusal to answer questions before a grand jury.236 The court reasoned
that the threat of imprisonment makes a civil contempt proceeding effective, but that "[t]he civil label did not obscure the penal nature of the
proceeding." 237
Finally, in Vail v. Quinlan,23 8 a district court in the Southern District
of New York considered an action challenging the constitutionality of
provisions of the New York Judiciary Law dealing with the collection of
money judgments. The court stated that without counsel, the right to a
hearing before imprisonment is ineffective, adding that "a debtor who is
deprived of his liberty is as much entitled to due process as is a defendant
charged with a crime. ,'239 The court held unconstitutional sections of the
law that subjected the indigent debtor to imprisonment without informing
him of his right to appointed counsel under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
E. State Court Decisions Which Do Not Recognize an Absolute Right
to Appointed Counsel
Not all states have found an automatic right to counsel for indigents
who face the threat of incarceration in civil cases. Several states have
232. Id. at 1155-56. The contemnor in In re Di Bella, 518 F.2d 955 (2nd Cir. 1974), was not
indigent, and the court did not discuss whether it would recognize a right to court-appointed counsel
for indigents. The court did rely, however, on three circuit court cases in which the courts had found
a right to appointed counsel for indigents in civil contempt roceedings. The court cited Henkel v.
Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973), see supra text accompanying notes 61-63; In re Kilgo,
484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973), see supra text accompanying notes 73-74; and United States v. Sun
Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972), see supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
233. 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973).
234. Id. at 1221.
235. 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972).
236. Id. at 1369.
237. Id.
238. 406 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327 (1977).
239. 406 F. Supp. at 960. For authority, the court cited inter alia United States v. Sun Kung
Kang, 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972).
240. 406 F. Supp. at 959-60.
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flatly rejected the notion that sixth amendment guarantees are applicable
to civil proceedings. Others have found the limited due process right
recognized by the Rael court.
In State v. Walker,2 41 the Louisiana Supreme Court denied the defendants' application for writs of certiorari, finding no merit in the argument
that they were entitled to counsel in a civil contempt proceeding. The
majority interpreted Argersinger v. Hamlin242 as requiring counsel only
in criminal proceedings.2 43 Three justices dissented. 2"
In Jolly v. Wright,2" the North Carolina Supreme Court held that due
process did not require automatic appointment of counsel for indigents
in civil contempt cases for non-support because these cases usually were
not complex in nature.246 The court stated that counsel need be appointed
only where it is necessary to ensure fundamental fairness. The Jolly court
rejected a sixth amendment analysis, holding that the right applies only
to criminal proceedings.247
In Sword v. Sword,2 48 the trial court found the defendant to be in
contempt for failure to pay child support and sentenced him to one year
in jail. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the extension of the
right to appointed counsel in civil contempt cases was unnecessary because the defendant "may end his imprisonment at any moment by merely
complying with the court's order, or may convince the court after a short
period of confinement that he will comply. 2 49 The court also cited the
state's interests in efficiency and the extra burden on the courts as reasons
for not extending the right to counsel.25 The court found that Argersinger
v. Hamlin25 was not an appropriate guideline for support proceedings
because it dealt with criminal prosecutions.25 2
241. 386 So. 2d 908 (La. 1980).
242. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
243. 386 So. 2d at909.
244. One dissenter asserted that the defendant had a right to counsel because the contempt was
in fact a criminal proceeding. A second dissenter contended that an indigent has a right to appointed
counsel in either civil or criminal contempt proceedings if he is faced with the possibility of
imprisonment. Id. As authority, the second dissenting justice cited United States v. Anderson, 553
F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1977); In re Di Bella, 518 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215
(4th Cir. 1973); and Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973).
245. 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980).
246. Id.at __, 265 S.E.2d at143.
247. Id. at-., 265 S.E.2d at142. In Davenport v. Memphis, 572 S.W.2d. 265 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1978), the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered a contempt for nonpayment of child support. The
court held that in a civil contempt proceeding, the defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel.
Id. at 267. The court distinguished Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), because the case
before it was civil and the defendant had the "keys to the jailhouse" and "remained incarcerated
of his own volition." 572 S.W.2d at 266-67.
248. 59 Mich. App. 730, 229 N.W.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1975), aftfd, 399 Mich. 367, 249 N.W.
2d 88 (1976).
249. Id. at -, 229 N.W.2d at910.
250. Id.
251. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
252. 59 Mich. App. at -, 229 N.W.2d at911. The Sword court painted a frightening picture
of what could result
from an extension of the right
to counsel and jury:
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The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the court of appeals, finding
that "the nature of non-support civil proceedings is usually not complex." 253 The court stated that a judge may appoint counsel in a complex
case, but that the court would not "make a general rule to fit the exception
in civil non-support cases. 254
Finally, in Duval v. Duval,255 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held
that a trial court may appoint counsel for an indigent defendant in a
complicated civil contempt hearing if the defendant may be subject to
imprisonment. The court stated that due process does not require assignment of counsel in all civil cases where the possibility of incarceration
exists, but only in those where the defendant would be treated unfairly
if counsel were not provided. The court found that the sixth amendment
right to counsel applied only in criminal proceedings and therefore any
right in a civil action had to be found in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.256
F. Reflections on the Right to Counsel Decisions of Other Jurisdictions
The New Mexico Supreme Court is not alone in deciding that an
indigent defendant does not have an absolute right to appointed counsel
in contempt proceedings for nonpayment of child support. Those decisions
in accord with Rael are based on parallel reasoning. The majority of state
and federal decisions, however, recognize a right to appointed counsel
in civil contempt proceedings if those proceedings may result in incarceration. Rejecting a technical civil-criminal analysis, most of these cases
are based on the recognition that the defendant's liberty interest is at
stake. Additionally, many of these cases treat the state's involvement as
bringing to bear the state's power, and, therefore, requiring the appointment of counsel under the sixth amendment.
Few of the decisions rejecting the sixth amendment analysis do so in
Once the word is passed to delinquents that they are entitled to an attorney and
a jury at the expense of the taxpayers, and that they have the protection of the
criminal procedure, it can safely be predicted, as it was by many when wholesale
plea bargaining arrived, that the support payments will decrease just as the
crime rate increased.
, 229 N.W.2d at 912.
Id. at
It should be noted that in a more recent case, People v. Johnson, 407 Mich. 134, 283 N.W.2d
632 (1979), the Michigan Supreme Court held that a defendant who was sentenced and fined for
refusing to testify before a grand jury, and who asserted his fifth amendment privilege, was entitled
to court-appointed counsel under the state constitution. The court found that whenever a witness
indicates that he wishes to exercise his fifth amendment privilege, there are sufficiently complex
legal questions as to require the assistance of counsel. The court stated that Sword was not inconsistent
because in the case before it, there were additional factors, such as "the state being the moving
party, the state's purpose to compel testimony in a criminal investigation, and the witness' assertion
of the fifth amendment privilege." People v. Johnson, 407 Mich. at __, 283 N.W.2d at 638.
253. Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, -, 249 N.W.2d 88, 94 (1976).
254. Id.
255. 114 N.H. 422, 322 A.2d 1 (1974).
256. Id. at -, 322 A.2d at 3.
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the context of leaving an indigent civil contemnor imprisoned. It may
well be that these courts more readily would apply a Scott-Argersinger
analysis if indefinite imprisonment were the actual result of a finding of
contempt, rather than a mere possibility easily disregarded with the facile
notion that the civil contemnor holds the keys to the jail. Especially in
cases where the indigent is incarcerated prior to a determination of contempt, it is difficult to flatly reject the right to assigned counsel or indeed
limit it to a balancing of the interests. The position of the indigent alleged
contemnor is so similar to that of a defendant awaiting trial in a criminal
case that the assignment of counsel should be almost axiomatic.
V. CONCLUSION
A. ProceduralReforms
As demonstrated by the discussion of non-New Mexico decisions, the
substantial weight of authority in cases where indigent fathers face contempt charges for their failure to pay child support requires the automatic
assignment of counsel. Not only does this line of decisions represent a
better reconciliation of the true nature of the contempt proceeding as a
quasi-criminal case in which the indigent father is prosecuted by the might
of the state and faces the threat of incarceration, but also it seems more
efficient than the case-by-case adjudication mandated by Rael. The study
of cases in Bernalillo County demonstrated that there were a number of
indigent fathers who were arrested on warrants for contempt charges and
then held in jail for substantial periods of time before hearings were
scheduled.257 No mechanism exists to assure that judges are notified when
civil defendants are incarcerated, and no procedure exists to assure a
prompt hearing to consider need for counsel and conditions of release
after the defendant is arrested. Had Rael followed the majority of decisions
on this issue, and required that counsel be appointed for each indigent,
the trial courts would have been forced to develop automatic procedures
analogous to those used in criminal arraignments to bring nonpaying
fathers before the courts for determination of financial status and assignment of counsel. As matters presently stand, however, the case-by-case
determination mandated by Rael is not made.258 Instead, the practice of
jailing unrepresented, indigent defendants continues without higher court
scrutiny. These judicial actions are unchecked because defendants without
counsel are not able to know or enforce their right to an articulated
determination of need for counsel under Rael.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
258. None of the lawyers at the Child Support Enforcement Bureau could recall a case where
the judge conducted a Rael inquiry into the need for assigned counsel, nor did they know of any
cases where counsel was assigned. Interviews held in October 1983.
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Interviews of court, jail, and sheriff personnel, and attorneys in Bernalillo County, demonstrate two flaws in the implementation of the Rael
decision.259 First, the decision did not prompt any changes in the procedure
by which litigants request settings, a task beyond the ability of incarcerated pro se defendants. Second, the judges are not conducting the inquiry
mandated by the Rael court:
The trial court is the proper evaluator of the need for counsel on a
case-by-case basis, considering factors such as the indigent's ability
to understand the proceeding, the complexity of the legal and factual
issues, and the defenses that might be presented. We hold that the
trial court must make a case-by-case determination, based on articulated reasons, whether fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel to assist an indigent defendant in a nonsupport civil
contempt hearing, and may in the exercise of its sound discretion,
appoint counsel in the proper case."
Under the Rael decision, it is necessary that the court examine each case
for the need for appointed counsel and articulate the reasons for its decision. Were such a hearing to take place promptly and reliably, it would
alleviate the inequities occurring under the present system. Once Rael
hearings are scheduled regularly and conducted conscientiously, even the
limited right to counsel recognized in Rael should be enough to protect
indigent pro se civil defendants who are incarcerated. This protection
should be sufficient because the criteria listed in Rael to determine when
counsel should be assigned appear to fit all indigent, incarcerated defendants.
Rael was arrested on a bench warrant; however, he was able to bond
out before the contempt hearing. Thus in Rael's case, the supreme court
did not face the question of whether the indigent father who is arrested
on a bench warrant and remains in jail automatically may be entitled to
assigned counsel. In order to resolve this question, the court need not
rely on the Argersinger-Scott26 brightline test that imprisonment triggers
the sixth amendment right to counsel. Instead, the right to counsel for
incarcerated, indigent contemnors can rest on the due process and fundamental fairness factors enumerated in Rael.
Even if, as the Rael court noted, defense to a civil contempt sometimes
is a straightforward matter of accounting,262 it is not simple when the
259. Individuals at the Civil Division of the Second Judicial District (Bernalillo County), Court
Relations Office, Bernalillo County Detention Center, Administration of Bernalillo County Sheriff's
Department, and Enforcement Bureau, New Mexico Department of Human Services, were interviewed by students involved in the research for this article. See also infra, notes 254-62.
260. 97 N.M. at 645, 642 P.2d at 1104.
261. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
262. 97 N.M. at 644, 642 P.2d at 1103.
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father is imprisoned without access to records, documents, and witnesses.
Indeed, it may be impossible for the defendant to marshal physical and
testimonial evidence while kept behind bars. This situation alone should
persuade the court that the defense of indigent contemnors who are incarcerated always is sufficiently complex to require the assistance of
counsel. The three cases described in detail in Section II C, Case Histories,
are examples of proceedings where fundamental fairness would have
required assignment of counsel. Likewise, the court should find that the
inability of the incarcerated pro se litigant to obtain settings and move
his case along calls for assignment of counsel. This finding would be
consistent with the directive in Rael to appoint counsel to those who are
unable to understand the proceedings.
Beyond limiting Rael's impact to those civil contemnors who have
obtained their liberty before their contempt hearing, however, it seems
that a number of reforms in the administration of the Rael decision are
needed to protect the due process rights of indigent civil litigants. Foremost, there should be a standard procedure for issuing bench warrants
and for obtaining court review once the warrants are executed.
Currently, there is no provision which ensures that the party requesting
a warrant or the judge issuing a warrant will be notified when the defendant
is arrested.263 Nor is there a procedure which brings an incarcerated civil
defendant before the court shortly after arrest. 2" Therefore, there is no
rapid judicial determination of whether an indigent civil contemnor will
remain incarcerated and require the assistance of counsel.265 Prolonged
incarceration caused by inattention rather than design comports with neither due process266 nor good sense. 67 At a minimum, the court automatically should schedule an arraignment-type appearance promptly after the
defendant is arrested.26 8 At this hearing, the court should review the
263. See supra text accompanying notes 24-31. While attorneys frequently request that they be
notified when the warrant is served, these directives are not always followed. Particularly in cases
where the defendant is arrested for another reason, i.e., a traffic stop, and the arresting officer is
notified that there is an outstanding warrant for the defendant, it is most unlikely that opposing
counsel will be told that the civil warrant has been executed. Lawyers from the Child Support
Enforcement Bureau report that they learn of these cases only if they are called by the defendant.
264. Judges who are informed that a defendant has been arrested on a civil bench warrant have
varied practices. Some will schedule a hearing immediately, while others will require a written
request for setting, filed through normal channels, a process which may result in weeks of delay.
Interviews with lawyers in the Child Support Enforcement Division, October 1983.
265. See supra, Section II B.
266. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
267. Incarceration costs approximately $55 per person per day. Interview with John Garcia,
Financial Analyst, Bemalillo County Detention Center (October 13, 1983).
268. Many cases since Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), have discussed the due process
right to a prompt hearing with adequate notice. Recently, in the case of Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753 (1982), the Supreme Court held that because the "[f]reedom of personal choice in
matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" due
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defendant's financial status, establish conditions of release, and hold a
Rael inquiry on the defendant's ability to understand the proceedings and
represent himself. This procedure would obviate the possibility that the
defendant will languish in jail, powerless and forgotten, for extended
periods of time. Such a procedure also might increase the likelihood that
the trial court would follow the mandate of Rael.
B. FurtherReflections on the Nonsupport Process
The nonsupport contempt cases present another, more difficult question
than procedural due process and the right to counsel. That question is
what to do with fathers who do not work, cannot pay, and who repeatedly
disregard the orders of the court.
The review of the court files in the cases of incarcerated civil contemnors reveals a revolving door quality to the defendants' contacts with the
court.269 The defendant who does not pay child support does not appear
in court to explain his failure to comply, and is arrested on a warrant.
When the defendant finally is brought to court, most often, he persuades
the judge that he is unemployed and has no money. He then is ordered
to report on a weekly or monthly basis to the Child Support Enforcement
Bureau on his job-seeking efforts. Sometimes he is given forms to mail
to the Support Bureau in order to facilitate the reporting process. Typically, no reports are forthcoming regardless of how sternly the court
admonishes the defendant and how fervently the defendant promises to
comply. Months pass and the defendant again is required to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt. Often the defendant does not
appear in response to the summons; a bench warrant is issued and he is
arrested once again.
In the vast majority of these cases, thousands of dollars of taxpayers'
money are spent to support the defendants' children.27 The efforts to
obtain reimbursement, though legitimate, are attempts to squeeze blood
from a stone. The fathers are the hard-core unemployed: unskilled, uneducated, unmotivated, and owing more in arrearages than they will earn
in years. On a moral level, one may condemn these men for abandoning
their support obligations to the children they fathered. On a societal level,
one may abhor the cavalier attitude with which they disregard the directives of the court, not only the impossible orders to pay, but also the
summonses and the orders to report to the Child Support Enforcement
process requires the state to prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. This demonstrates the continued willingness of the court to utilize the Mathews balancing test to protect
interests other than physical liberty.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
270. See, e.g., McClelland and Eby, Child Support Enforcement: The New Mexico Experience,
9 N.M.L. Rev. 26 (1978-79).
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Bureau. It does seem, however, a pointless expenditure of resources to
repeatedly arrest these fathers, jail them, release them, and start all over
again, until the children reach their majority or beyond.
While the use of the contempt power may be successful in coercing
support payments in some cases,271 it clearly fails with this group. It may
be necessary to adopt procedures from criminal law to deal with these
individuals. For instance, using community service as an alternative to
monetary payments might increase compliance with court orders. Additionally, the finality of a criminal-type jail sentence, accompanied by
representation by counsel, might permit the closing of the case once and
for all, ending the protracted expenditure of time and resources which
accomplishes so little.
The solution is disquietingly complex. It will be difficult to identify
which indigent fathers will never pay. It will be repugnant to excuse them
from their parental obligations. Under the present system, however, the
time and resources of the enforcement process will be expended repeatedly
and the fruits of these expenditures will be none other than frustration
and grief.

271. See Chambers, Men Who Know They Are Watched: Some Benefits and Costs of Jailing for
Nonpayment of Support, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 900 (1977).

